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Monday, October 31, 2005
 
Folt's Reponse to Appleton

Thanks to Dartlog for this. Here's the response to Appleton.

>>Subject: Message from Dean Folt
>>To: Sergei A. Kan, Kathleen A. Corrigan, Edward M. Berger, John S. Winn, Jeremy B. Rutter, Prasad Jayanti, Dennis Washburn, Xiahong Feng, Jonathan S. Skinner, Laura-Ann Petitto, Eric W. Hansen, Peter W. Travis, Amy L. Lawrence, Mark J. Williams, Katharine Conley, Francis J. Magilligan, Bruce Duncan, M. Anne Saadah, P. David Lagomarsino, trs@gauss.dartmouth.edu (Thomas R. Shemanske), Theodore C. Levin, James H. Moor, thorsten@partita.dartmouth.edu (John R. Thorstensen), George L. Wolford II, Susan Ackerman, Lev L. Loseff, Misagh Parsa, Lenore A. Grenoble, Colleen M. Randall, Timothy P. Hackett, J. Martin Favor, Steven J. Ericson, Graziella Parati, Andrew J. Friedland, Annelise Orleck, Israel Reyes, Lindsay J. Whaley, Donald E. Pease Jr, Colin G. Calloway, Judith A. Byfield
>>
>>
>
>Dear Colleagues,
>
>I understand that a mass email titled, "The Decline of Academic Freedom at Dartmouth College" was sent to many members of the faculty last Thursday. While I do not know who received the email, I have heard about it from faculty in many departments. I am writing to you in your role as Chair to provide you with the correct information which you can discuss with your faculty if questions arise. The "Decline of Academic Freedom" email is filled with errors and unpleasant personal allusions, but rather than address all of them, I am going to focus on the errors that touch on fundamental issues for the faculty.
>
>The email concerned grading issues in Music 3 taught during the fall 2004 to 76 students (final enrollment). At the conclusion of the course, the Dean's Office received 42 student complaints -- an unprecedented number – from students who received grades from A- to D. As is standard procedure, the Associate Dean for the responsible division (in this case for Humanities) was in charge of the inquiry into complaints. The review was very thorough and took four months to complete. It included: interviews by the Assistant Dean with 28 complaining students who were on campus, review by the Associate Dean of grades on all assignments, review of course information distributed to students (including information about grading criteria) and a discussion between the Associate Dean and the Professor about grading practices. Our investigation concluded that unspecified extra credit had been given to students who came to speak with the instructor about the course and their compositions, regardless of whether they improved their work based on his feedback, and that students had never been told that they could raise their grades simply by meeting with the instructor.
>
>Under the circumstances, the Associate Dean and I both felt that some accommodation was necessary to ensure the student's right to understandable and fair grading. It was impractical to re-grade the musical compositions; it was weeks after the end of the term, students had dispersed and there were no faculty on campus available to undertake such a task. Instead, the students were given the option of receiving credit instead of a grade for the course. Please note that not a single student grade was raised and thus no GPA's were "inflated." However, because all students had passed the course, all students were given the option to receive credit for the course (this is like using Dartmouth's NRO option).
>
>I want to make it clear that an alleged concern that the grades were either too high or too low was never a consideration. Many other courses have mean and median grades similar to that of Music 3 in the fall of 2004.
>
>I also wish to emphasize that student complaints about grades are very rare at Dartmouth and only lead to administrative action in the most exceptional cases where there is clear evidence – after review by assistant and associate deans – of unfairness in the assignation of grades. I am aware of fewer than 5 grading complaints coming to the Dean's office about the more than 6000 courses taught by Arts & Science faculty in the last 4 years. However, if you or any of your faculty have questions about faculty independence in grading, please contact the Dean of Faculty or any of the Associate Deans.
>
>Finally, in the context of this case, a broad assertion has been made that Dartmouth has a lack of standards and is uninterested or even complicit in the perpetuation of grade inflation. This is simply not true. Dartmouth was one of the first institutions to address grade inflation when it began reporting the median grade on the transcripts. Last year, the Committee on Instruction began discussions about grading practices once again and they plan to examine this issue more closely in the coming year. I look forward to working with the faculty on this and trust we will explore this complex question with the careful reflection and consideration it deserves.
>
>Thank you.
>
>Carol



 
New Nomination

SCOTUSblog provides links to all the commentary on Alito that you would ever wish to read.

A biography of Judge Samuel Alito is online at Wikipedia. I'll be posting my thoughts of the nominations over the next few days.

That being said, Professor Bainbridge has been itching for a fight. Now we've got one.



 
Liberal Clevage

The Nation has a great (long) essay about leftist support for humanitarian intereventionism. In acknowledging that the war divided the left, the Nation attempts to tease out the basis of pro-war liberalism. Long ago, in the lead up the Iraq war, ChienWen and others offered that to truly support human rights one also had support the "liberation" of Baghdad. I will find the archival evidence and post links to those later. The liberals that the Nation describes are those leftists for whom a commiment to humanitariasm drove them to support the neo-conservative liberation.

In writing about Paul Berman, the Nation observes that pro-war liberals made common cause with the pro-war right only to provide domestic political support for a declaration of war. However, the underlying ideological sources of that support were very different.
[T]he principal hero of Berman's story is Bernard Kouchner, the Nation writes, a founder of Doctors Without Borders and head of the United Nations administration in Kosovo from July 1999 to January 2001. For Berman "nobody in Europe was more heroic" than this "fearless humanitarian doctor" who always seemed to be "on a mission against injustice." The basic principle underlying Kouchner's political activism was that "the supremely oppressed had a right to be rescued, no matter what the theorists of anti-imperialism or the defenders of the inviolability of borders might say." Kouchner supported the war because he knew that Iraq was studded with Srebrenicas. If you hate genocide, place matters of conscience at the heart of your thinking and appreciate the larger grandeur of the interventionist idea (in Kouchner's terms, the droit d'ingérence, or right of interference), then you can only applaud the American invasion of Iraq. Never mind that most ex-'68ers, including Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Joschka Fischer, opposed the war as an expression of the Bush Administration's revolutionary hubris. Kouchner's example reassures Berman that an ex-'68er could join the war party and preserve his "left-wing soul."
The Nation ultimately decides that the pro-war liberal won't survive the leftovers of the Iraq war.

The article also traces the evolution of the thought of David Reiff. Reiff, once committed to interventionism, has backpedaled. The Nation writes, "[a]lthough Rieff "began the decade in Sarajevo a convinced interventionist," today he is "no longer an interventionist," having returned from Iraq with grave "doubts about the entire project of humanitarian intervention." This is the same Reiff who loosed his pen against lefty non-interventionists calling them: "a left that would prefer to see genocide in Bosnia and the mass deportation of the Kosovars rather than strengthen, however marginally, the hegemony of the United States."

Where does Reiff stand on the issue today?
Faced with the "appalling and degrading" conditions in postwar Iraq, where things were "worse than anything I was able to write about it," Rieff has felt compelled to reconsider his advocacy of US-led humanitarian intervention. What he discovered on his visits to Iraq was a collapsed state, not a liberated country. Those who fervently embrace American power, it turns out, are also condemning people to death. Rieff shifts his emphasis, therefore, from the complicity of noninterventionists to the complicity of interventionists. He begins to write persuasively about "the responsibility one has in advocating war when one will have little or no responsibility or say in how it is waged." Idealists who trumpeted a purely humanitarian case for invading Iraq should have known that their benevolent motives were not sufficient to trigger the war and were not going to govern the way the war and the occupation unfolded.


Read the article.



Sunday, October 30, 2005
 
Ahmadinejad's rant: the full text

Courtesy of Martin Kramer, here's the full text of the Iranian President's anti-Israel rant.



 
Weekend News Roundup- Sunday Edition

Reset your clocks an hour back if you haven't yet!

(1) Bouncing back from these latest series of disaster will not be easy for the Bush administration. The Washington Post makes a convincing argument to that effect. See my argument here on the particular difficulties of Bush domestically after Miers.

(2) Tranisitioning war leaders, partisan groups, and terrorist parties into a nonviolent political process can be difficult. One the main tools the current regime has is the trial of Hussein as an attempt to demonize him and shore up its legitimacy. Each constituency brings a different agenda to the table. In Iraq the prize, at the moment, is leverage in the post-war state. The Sunnis have recently begun to prepare for elections; but why? Are they tactical democrats or truly reformed? Will they end the insurgency?

The other former terrorist group, that has been remarkably quiet since the democratic process began, is the Kurds whose anti-Hussien terrorism is well know. It seems like they've begun to carve up a section of Northern Iraq for their own state. The "Kurdish political leaders said the repatriations are designed to correct the policies of ousted President Saddam Hussein, who replaced thousands of Kurds in the region with Arabs from the south. The Kurdish parties have seized control of the process, they said, because the Iraqi government has failed to implement an agreement to return Kurdish residents to their homes." The fight over the city, Kirkuk, could be the next Bleeding Kansas. The Washington Post has the details.

(3) Bush makes the case for staying in Iraq in USA Today. Iraq is going to be a problem given logistical issues.

(4) In the face of a Security Council resolution, Syria launches an internal probe to investigate the murder of a Lebanese prime minister. The Boston Globe reports.



 
Condi in 2008

The Guardian provides an excerpt from a new book called Condi vs. Hillary. If you have some money, and you can spare it, buy it. It's a really fun read.

Lots of unofficial, run Condi, sites are popping up over the internet. See here, here, and here. My favorite pro-Condi site is the "Blogs for Condi." Check out their blog roll. When Condi took British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw to visit Alabama, the rumors flew. See also this.

I wanted to be the first black president in 2024.

Seriously, though, what should we think of all the noise around Condi's possible run for the presidency?



Saturday, October 29, 2005
 
Reflection, Relationships, and Stupidity

There's a lot of bad writing and thinking about relationships.

The only thing we do worse than relationships, I think, is talk about philosophy and "intellectualism."

And it truly bothers me.

This rant inspired by an essay entitled: Ditching the Intellectuals: Why Am I Attracted To Men Who Overthink?

Let's start with first conditions: human existence is an existence where one lives in a world populated with other people who probably don't have your best interests in mind. They don't know you. They can't read your mind. The non-verbal signals you send as well as your fanciful, concocted emotional pleas for sympathy and attention are either unknowingly missed or willfully ignored. The extent to which you are loved varies directly with the extent to which you communicate. Get over yourself, open your mouth, and tell people what you want.

Point two, philosophy is not about live a live of reflection "distanced" from reality. Any one who tells you that has not studied philosophy. In what has become a cliche remark as the justification for disinterested contemplation, someone might retort "the unexamined life is not worth living." Foolish creature, think about what you are saying. You examine a life to live it. Philosophy is the act of gathering knowledge about the world to inform how one should live in the world. Thinking is not separate from doing; in fact, you think to do. If you believe that you know philosophy and think otherwise, I say read the texts and see for yourself that I speak the truth.

Point three, "intellectualism" is not hot. If your thinking about something is disconnected from your life-project and the substantive way you live, you are fool who looks in the mirror and forgets what he/she looks like. When one desires a thinker as a soul-mate, one desires not a jargon-laden empty suit, but rather a person who attempts to grasp the meaning of his/her performances, and the impact that his/her living has on others. The intellectual is one who understands that others exists, and attempts to negotiate that fact.

Let me sum up by being perfectly clear: if you act without thinking, you are an idiot. There is neither hope nor meaning in your actions. You are sound and fury signifying nothing. Lusting after a person who does not think about their actions means that you are supporting the project of fools. If you think without acting, or even valorize such a life, you are a dying person. Your thoughts and your life will come to nought. People won't know you; people won't care about you; and you'll die in the icy recesses of your own mind. Without others you are nothing.



 
Weekend News Roundup- Saturday Edition

There are not a lot of new news stories, but here are the highlights.

(1) Libby's indictment, and the continuing investigation, while not formally implicating the vice-president, does keep the matter close to his office. And since I heard from some people who have been working in Washington recently that the Office of the Vice President has been the most ardent about opposing the torture amendment, and the most vociferous in granting the CIA the right to torture, I'm hoping he goes down. The Seattle Times provides the details. The Washington Post writes about the Vice-President and torture here.

(2) Nelson Mandela produces a comic book about his life. The Scotsman reports.

(3) Japan is attempting the amend its pacifist constitution, which currently renounces the use of force as a means to settle disputes and forbids Japanese possession of land, sea, and air forces, to state that war is illegal but that Japan can have security forces for self-defense. Since they already have a military, it's basically amending the law to come to terms with current practice. MSN-Mainchi Daily News has the report.

(4) A moment of silence for Rosa Parks. And a statement we can all agree to: May all in America who lack civil rights be granted those rights with all deliberate speed. The Washington Post Op/ed pages offer a toast to judicial activism. If you believe in judicial restraint, see my post on gay rights here. If you believe in originalism or conservative readings of the Constitutional text, see my post on that here.



 
UnMiered: Bush's Next Move

SCOTUSblog offers that Bush cannot nominate Gonzales to the court, but will want to taunt the group he perceives as having brought down his nominee.
As Miers' nomination got into deeper trouble, some observers who are close to the President had said that it would come close to wrecking this presidency if he were forced to back down on Miers. That perhaps was an exaggeration, but the President, already newly vulnerable because of the hurricane disasters, the Iraq war, and the criminal investigation focused on figures high in his government, is perceived to have less political authority than he had even at the beginning of this month. He may not be in the mood, or have the "political capital," to wage another costly battle over the Supreme Court seat.

At the same time, however, the President undoubtedly is angry about having been forced to give up on Miers. His announcement (a decision he attributed to Miers' preference, not his) was restrained, but reflected keen disappointment. Because it was the most conservative elements of his political following that brought this about, he may be determined not to surrender by going to a nominee more clearly in favor with that sector.

Still, the best way to taunt that group -- naming Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez, unpopular with many conservatives -- may not be available to him. Gonzalez's nomination would run into the same problem that the President cited in withdrawing Miers' name: his unwillingness to give senators access to internal White House legal papers. The attorney general was White House Counsel just ahead of Miers, and he had more tenure and more influence in the job than she did, and senators surely would demand access to materials showing Gonzalez's role in the Executive Mansion, just as they did with Miers.

The Miers nomination, though, did give political tacticians like Rove--who, I assure you, memorized every major conservative blogger and politician to speak out against Miers--clear signals about which Republicans aren't interested in being a part of a Bush-dominated Republican party. Expect censure soon.

My analysis: Bush likes surprises, but his willingness to gamble is tempered by the mess he finds himself in. I predict that we will get a nominee by November 2. I have four reasons for this. My two posts on why Bush selecting Miers: for her pro-business leanings and his tactical situation should look differently for the next candidate.

First, the White House needs to let the rumor mill test the temperature of the conservative waters. Conservative bloggers and the illegentsia will offer the names up that they believe Bush should nominated. I don't think Bush will feel as restricted to pick a minority, a woman, or a non-judge this time. Though if there are any former Solicitor Generals that would merit scrutiny, Bush might go down that route. Whatever Bush decides to do, Slate offers that there won't be any more code speak about Roe.

Second, the rumor mill allows Reid and the Gang of 14 to signal their limits of toleration. Bush really doesn't have the patience to deal with a filibuster.

Third, the Administration will have more information about Rove's final political state. If Rove can still play a role in the White House, he and Miers will then go through an extremely through process to pick an all-star candidate. The White House desperately needs another successful candidate like Roberts for Chief and Ben S. Bernanke for Federal Reserve Chairman. Voxbaby provides some details. Even the TNR had something nice to say about Bernanke.

Fourth, Bush can't look likes he's directly pandering the extremist section of his party. While he's quite willing to govern from the Right, he wishes to do so through his political muscle, not from a position of weakness.



Friday, October 28, 2005
 
Dead on Arrival?

Thanks to Brad Plumer for this one. He writes: "No larger moral lurking here, but Dexter Filkins' New York Times Magazine story on Iraq from last weekend was a really good read. Since the topic of the hour seems to be whether the occupation was doomed from the start or could have succeeded with a more competent helmsman, these four paragraphs should do the trick..."

Plumer's absolutely correct. Check out his post and the orignal article.



 
News Roundup

I'm going to try and start a daily tradition of providing a brief news roundup everyday.

Domestic News

(1) Lewis Libby, a senior aide to Vice President Dick Cheney who was indicted in the CIA leak investigation, has resigned and left the White House. Libby was indicted on five criminal counts of obstruction of justice, perjury and making false statements after a two-year investigation into the leak of a covert CIA operative's identity.

The Toronto Star provides the details. Also consider USA Today and Slate.

(2) The debate over Harriet Miers continues. Yesterday, White House Counsel Harriet Miers withdrew her nomination to the the Supreme Court. President Bush reluctantly accepted it. MSNBC provides the details.

(3) Libby and Rove are not the only Republicans under fire these days. A coin dealer and major GOP donor, Tom Noe, finds himself at the center of a scandal in Ohio. He was charged Thursday with illegally funneling $45,400 in contributions to President Bush's re-election bid. MSN Money provides the details.

(4) People in Deleware mistake a woman who hung herself for Halloween decorations.(Did the realism tip anyone off?) BBC News has the details.

World News

(1) The details of the oil-for-food scandal keep emerging. The Post-Gazette explains.

(2) Iran's radical comments about Death to Israel and burying the Zionist enemy yesterday spurned widespread condemnation from many major political leaders in Europe and in America. News network Al Jazeera provides those details. With continuing pressure from the EU and the US toward Iran's nuclear programme, Xinhua reports that the Security Council is considered a British-drafted presidential statement to denounce the leader's comments. Given that Israel called for the ejection of Iran from the United Nations, Kofi Annan's comment that "Israel, a long-standing member of the United Nations, had the same rights and obligations as every other member" might be either a direct response to Israel or Iran.

(3) Al Jazeera provides the details on the Israeli bombings of the Islamic Jihad in Palestine.

(4) The International Herald Tribune reports that North Korea may be returning to the world again.

(5) ABC News: the Sunnis will take part in elections and are fielding candidates.

(6)The Security Council is truly busy with the Middle East as that body is consider a Franco-American resolution against Syria. Forbes provides the info. With Britain also sponsoring the bill, most of the opposition in the council is coming from countries like Algeria. At issue is "the paragraph containing an implicit threat of economic or diplomatic sanctions under article 41 of the UN Charter." The article continues: "The potential sanctions themselves have also been toned down, especially those dealing with travel restrictions and the freezing of funds and assets that UN members are called to comply with. Travel restrictions would not apply 'on grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligation' or where the monitoring committee deems an exemption is justified, according to the new draft. Funds and other assets would be exempted from freezing when they are deemed 'necessary for basic expenses, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges' or for payment of some legal fees."

(7) France decides that its farms are more important the free trade and global justice. News Telegraph provides the details.

(8) Lastly, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi, in the name of regional peace, is urged to stop his controversial visits as a head of state to the Yasukuni war shrine, which is host to many Japanese military dead including WWII war criminals.



Thursday, October 27, 2005
 
There goes another one

Dartmouth's English Department is losing the great Peter Saccio to retirement. Like John Stevenson, he was prone to wearing fancy dress while walking around Hanover. As for his reputation as a lecturer, I have nothing to add except that it was well deserved -- though not always because of his own abilities as a performer. I remember one of his lectures on King Lear being punctuated by a very loud rumbling noise akin to a thunderclap (it turned out to be construction work).



 
Academic Freedom, Appleton, and Folt

Dartlog today posted this letter which is theoretically from Jon Appleton.
Date: 20 Oct 2005 16:52:33 EDT
From: Jon H. Appleton
Subject: The Decline of Academic Freedom at Dartmouth College
To: (Recipient list suppressed)

Dear Colleagues:

The Supreme Court declared in Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing , 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985): When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision. . . they should show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment. Plainly, they may not override it unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.

I came to teach music and musical composition at Dartmouth College nearly forty years ago. It had recently emerged from the tradition of a gentlemen's finishing school to an institution of intellectual strength, brought about in part by the mathematician John G. Kemeny. My own work as a composer dealt mostly with electro-acoustic music, a very new field at the time. Research with colleagues in engineering and computer science led to the creation of a user-friendly system where students without previous musical experience could try their hand at composing.

In 1972, together with my colleague Christian Wolff, we initiated an undergraduate course called Music and Technology. Over the years students used increasingly sophisticated computer programs to compose short electronic music compositions. This became the most popular feature of the course and it counted as half of the final grade. Thirty-three years ago the course enrolled 35 students but during the last several years I saw my enrollment in the course grow to 85.

Nowadays, all students have access to and indeed most own computers and are comfortable with the software used to compose music. There are probably too many musical options for them now and the trick is to limit the number of musical ideas so as to develop structure and continuity in their work. It is amazing to me that I have given this creative experience to more than 3000 non-music undergraduates over the last thirty-three years. Many alumni return to tell me how important this experience was in broadening their musical taste. Obviously it is very time consuming to listen to, criticize and grade 85 compositions even if they are less than three minutes each. Dartmouth College does not employ teaching assistants in the arts. Sometimes students are intimidated by the composition assignment and drop the course because they fear they will not get an A in the course. Dartmouth has done nothing to curb grade inflation unlike Princeton, for example. The pressure to give A grades is intense. It comes from the students and increasingly from their parents as well.

When teaching the Music and Technology course, I set aside class periods for students to present their first compositional attempts (their first drafts). Those that work through the term almost always improve. Two weeks before the composition assignments are due, I schedule individual appointments with all the students. Perhaps a quarter of the class never takes the chance to show me their work and this is because, sadly, they put off everything until the last minute. It is nearly impossible for a beginning composer to create anything significant the night before the assignment is due.

During all my years on the faculty of Dartmouth College, I graded as follows: A meant excellent, B was good, C was average, D was poor and if you didn't show up, you failed the course.

Somehow it escaped me that the average grade at Dartmouth last year was a B+. Thus when I taught Music and Technology in the Fall term of 2004, I gave 30 As, 25 Bs, 15 Cs and 4 Ds (eleven students dropped the course for various reasons during the term). The students who earned less than an A were very upset. They wrote me angry notes such as "you nuked my GPA" and "how could I get a B in a music course?" and "my mother loved my composition."

The students complained to the chair of my department and to the Dean of Faculty Carol Folt. Their parents called to express outrage. I never saw these complaints but I got a message from the Dean of Faculty who asked what "metric" I used to grade these compositions? I asked what metric she thought Haydn used to grade Beethoven's compositions; or for that matter the "metric" used by Arnold Schoenberg when he taught John Cage. I explained to the Dean that r had been teaching this course successfully for thirty-three years and I was employed at Dartmouth because of my reputation as a composer. I offered to show the papers and compositions to the Dean but she never wanted to see them. I thought if something had gone terribly wrong with my teaching that perhaps an outside committee of composers might tender a second opinion. Alas, no administrator ever attended the class nor reviewed any of the student work.

A week later the Dean of Faculty informed the students that anyone unhappy with their grade could have it erased and be given a "credit" for the course. According to President James Wright, this was done without his knowledge and I want to note here that the president and I have been on the faculty for the same years and as dean, provost and president he has always been supportive of my work.

Until last year I thought that I would continue to teach at Dartmouth until I no longer felt useful to my students. However, because of this situation I am retiring from Dartmouth and will teach elsewhere for the next several years. There is nothing more I can do but to explain this to you, my colleagues. Perhaps you, through meetings of the faculty, your committees, etc. will be able to prevent the current Dean of Faculty from continuing to erode our academic freedom. If you think this was an isolated incident, let me paraphrase Pastor Martin Niemoller, "First they came for the music faculty and I did not speak out because I was not a musician. Then they came for the psychologists and I did not speak out because I was not a psychologist. Then they came for the biologists and I did not speak out because I was not a biologist. Then they came for me and there was no one left to speak out for me."

Jon H. Appleton

Arthur R. Virgin Professor of Music
HB 6242
Dartmouth College
Hanover, New Hampshire 03755 USA
Tel: +1-603-646-3960 http://eamusic.dartmouth.edu/~appleton/
Andrew Seal on the The Little Green Blog offers an analysis:
It is entirely possible that Appleton was actually targeted by Folt, as he published an op-ed in the D questioning Folt's qualifications as far back as November 10, 2004 (and again on March 9, 2005). In that op-ed, Appleton criticized the "small-minded" professors who drove Professor Gazzaniga out of the Dean of Faculty's position and partly led an effort to block Gazzaniga's removal. Not pulling any punches, he said, "People who are active and professionally involved in their own work don't have time to sit and bitch about the dean."

Appleton had earlier raised similar questions about the competency of new deans all the way back in late March, 1998, i.e. the turnover from Freedman's administration. Appleton was in fact a critic of Freedman, but was less than sanguine about the huge influx of brand new deans with little Dartmouth experience at that time.
On 3 October 2005, our very own Chien Wen wrote (see his post for links):
The loss of Michael Gazzaniga, Jon Appleton, and Jim Kuypers -- three of Dartmouth's most distinguished faculty members -- bodes unwell for the College. They will be missed as teachers and scholars; Gazzaniga, in particular, strikes me as being almost irreplaceable (something even his soon-to-be erstwhile colleagues admit). But of greater concern are the circumstances surrounding their departure, which are disturbingly similar. Each of the departing trio has been at odds, either implicitly or explicitly, with the Dean of the Faculty Carol Folt. Gazzaniga was Folt's predecessor and resigned as Dean because of "differences among faculty members" over his management style; most likely, the same faculty who voted him out voted Folt in. Appleton (a supporter of Gazzaniga) and Kuypers have both cited Folt as a reason for their departure. All three have chosen to leave despite their fondness for Dartmouth's students. As Joe writes, "These professors were not hired away. They jumped ship." This had better not become a trend. There are more discontented Dartmouth faculty at the moment than just these three.
Thoughts?



 
The Vatican and the Jews

ABC News writes today that : "Pope Benedict XVI marked the 40th anniversary of a landmark Vatican document on relations with Jews by calling Thursday for a renewed commitment for Catholics and Jews to deepen their bonds and work for the good of all humanity. Benedict issued a message that was read out during a commemoration of the "Nostra Aetate" document of the Second Vatican Council, in which the Catholic Church deplored anti-Semitism and repudiated the "deicide" charge that blamed Jews as a people for Christ's death."

It is very good news that the more conservative pope will continue John Paul's legacy of strong interfaith relations with the Italian and worldwide Jewish community. The announcement ceremony was not without its problems, however. "Rome's chief rabbi, Riccardo di Segni, told The Associated Press that he had refused to attend the ceremony because of the presence of one of the keynote speakers, Cardinal Jean-Marie Lustiger, a Jewish convert to Catholicism." In unhelpful language, Rabbi Riccardo di Segni ranted: "What is dialogue? If it means losing one's identity and crossing over to the other side, then it's not dialogue."

The Rabbi's comment are particularly unhelpful during a commemoration of a growing interfaith alliance. Adopting a siege mentality, the Rabbi played to ideas of antisemitic encroachment on the Jewish people, namely to the miedeval idea that conversion is death for a Jew. Rabbi David Rosen adds his voice in expressing the necessity of a Catholic rejection of proselytizing as a precondition to Jewish elite religious acceptance in his remark that "Catholics and Jews still needed to fully comprehend its implications, and said there were still key theological issues that remain to be worked out including whether the Catholic Church will relinquish the "invitation to conversion" to Christianity of the Jews." In short, give up a historically and confessionally important central idea of your faith so that we may feel welcome. What an awful vision of pluralism.

This strategy to interfaith dialouge is particularly unproductive given that a central tenant of the proselytizing religions, like Catholicism and Islam, is that the door is always open to anyone who wishes to be included in their special community of believers. Were the religious community not special enough to merit conversion, then one its main reasons for being would cease to exist. In a sense for proselytizing religions, there are only two types of people in the wold: believers and pre-believers. However, this particular-universality is not dangerous unless the respective faith institutions attempt to impose a uniform set of beliefs (orthodoxy) and/or practices (orthopraxy) onto any given social community. As long as the religious beliefs do not have the force of law, in either a formal or an informal* sense, then we can imagine pluralistic interfaith arrangements.

*A religious belief attains the status of being informally legally enforced when individuals who do not follow the observable implication of the belief or doctrine cannot meaningful represent and reproduce themselves in the social and political spheres due to their deviance from the prevailing norms. For example, being not observing Shabbat (the Sabbath) in an Orthodox Jewish community, or, not participating in Protestant Christian social forms in some southern communities effectively ostracizes a person and their family from community life in those communities. In most cases these laws are not legally enforced.



 
Miers Nomination Withdrawn: Open Thread

The Dallas Baptist Standard offers its perspective on the Miers fiasco.

The Washington Post offers that we are going to see a Roberts-like nomination in the future. That, unfortunately, might mean some random male movement conservative who doesn't share the Bush's administrations softer approach to abortion and affirmative action.

Adam Spheen has an analysis at the Agenda Gap trying to find out who will unite conservatives. He also posts his inital reaction.

I am personally saddened. I wanted Miers to make to the nominations. I wanted her on the Court.
Comment away.



 
Confused about Plamegate?

Your answer is definitely yes if the word "Plamegate" doesn't mean anything for you.

Have you been wondering what the whole deal with Plamegate and the CIA leak is all about? Fear not, for MSNBC breaks down the CIA leak story for non-political junkies. Highly Recommended.



 
Oil-for-Food: A Scandal or a Policy?

The Christian Science Monitor today releases the names of the companies implicated in the oil-for-food scandal. Paul Vocker, former Federal Reserve chair, released the report to the public.In light of the massive humanitarian crisis of the Iraqi sanctions, and the ensuing responsibility for the deaths it caused, the Security Council introduced "the oil-for-food program [as] one of the largest humanitarian efforts of all time, in terms of its scope and finances." The article continues: "Launched as a means of softening the blow of UN sanctions on ordinary Iraqis, it allowed Iraq to sell quantities of oil, provided most of the money was used to buy goods for Iraq's hard-pressed citizens."

Dirk Salomons, director of the program for humanitarian affairs at Columbia University, correctly and importantly adds: "Whatever the program's faults, its successes should also be remembered. The UN kept large chunks of the Iraqi population alive for over a decade."

The Monitor reports: "The accused represent virtually every nation that took part. Companies and individuals from 66 countries sent illegal kickbacks to Hussein's government, according to the Volcker inquiry. Those who simply paid an illegally high price for their oil to begin with came from 40 countries.

Among the firms named by the report are Volvo Construction Equipment, which allegedly paid $317,000 in extra fees to the Iraqi government on a $6.4 million contract. DaimlerChrysler tacked an extra $7,000 onto a $70,000 contract, according to the Volcker inquiry."


The amount collected by Hussein totaled 1.8 billion tax on the $64 billion program, which ran from 1996 to 2003. Is it really a scandal if everyone was involved? Wouldn't that it more of a policy?



 
Administrative note

This blog is currently undergoing some renovations. Some of them are purely cosmetic (like the colour scheme), but a few others (Haloscan comments, etc. ) are pretty substantial and may need time to implement. Blogging will continue as per usual.



Wednesday, October 26, 2005
 
The Bankruptcy of Originalist Constitutional Jurisprudence

Among constitutional law junkies, legal scholars, and some justices on the Supreme Court there is this mistaken idea of following and applying an originalist meaning of the constitution. CATO, as usual, has much to say in defense of the wrong opinion (CATO can usually be counted on the have the wrong opinion):
At the founding, and for some 150 years thereafter, the limits on congressional power provided by the Constitution of 1789 -- as modified by the Fourteenth Amendment -- were enforced by the Supreme Court. According to the textual plan, Congress is, with few exceptions, confined to the express powers enumerated in Article One of the Constitution. While these express powers were understood as flexible, they were nonetheless limited. When the federal government was limited to its enumerated powers, the states were left to the exercise of their police powers, subject to the limitations imposed upon them after the Civil War by the Fourteenth Amendment.
That's a pretty generous reading of post-civil war enforcement of state's rights. The Slaughterhouse Cases and other 19th century cases not only completely defanged the Civil Rights Act of 1866, but construed the 14th Amendment to create legal personality for corporations while blacks and natives languished and died under sharecropping, tribal cleansing, ghettoization, and exploitation. Given that we know, from the Congressional Record, that the Civil Rights Acts and the Fourteenth Amendment were designed, in part, to grant the Federal government power to protect and enable blacks, the Supreme Court's foot-dragging on this issue was more than a little disturbing. Many of the senators who wrote and defended these acts and that document were disgusted by how little the constitution at that time had to say about defending the weak against the uncaring trampling of titans. These senators only had contempt for the idea that the Constitution somehow limited them.
Sometime this fall, two of the five votes that made up the Lopez and Morrison majorities will have been replaced. Only Justice Clarence Thomas will be left from the three Raich dissenters. As the new chief justice (assuming he is confirmed), will John Roberts assume the role of his mentor William Rehnquist -- for whom he clerked -- and lead the Roberts Court to enforce the Constitution's original plan of limited federal power? Will President Bush now look for a nominee to replace Justice O'Connor who is as committed to the New Federalism as she was? Given that so many of the New Federalism cases were 5-4, if either of the new justices adopts the mantra of "judicial deference" to congressional power, then Chief Justice Rehnquist's death, along with Justice O'Connor's retirement, may presage the second death of federalism. A judicial withdrawal from enforcing the original limits on the powers of Congress would undo the New Federalist legacy of William Rehnquist.

As the president now decides who next to nominate, he would uphold the Constitution by selecting a person with a firm and demonstrated commitment to the Rehnquist Court's New Federalism legacy. Only such a choice would continue the movement to restore the "first principles" of constitutionally limited government that William Rehnquist affirmed so eloquently. One can hardly imagine a sadder end to the tenure of William Rehnquist than that his most prized and important contribution to constitutional law is aborted by a conservative Republican president and a Republican-controlled Senate.
What exactly would this "first principles" jurisprudence entail? Who cares exactly what a bunch of men 'meant' when they penned a document in the wake of revolution? We now know that their historical imaginations were radical for their historical moment, and that the passage of time has given us the potential for an enlarged perspective. Why limit ourselves to necrocracy?

The Declaration of Independence provides an excellent case study to evaluate originalist jurisprudence. The Declaration says:
When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.
This was a very radical idea at the time. In positing a set of "self-evident" divinely protected natural right, the writers of the Declaration of Independence turn against the pervasive legal positivist tradition of that day which maintained that the rights persons held were the rights given to them by the sovereign. Moreover, the securing of these rights of which Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of happiness were but just three, were the reasons why governments existed. In fact, the Declaration continues, the governments derived their "just powers"--that is those powers which a government can wield and hold morally--when those who governed consent in the manner, mode, and method of the governance. There is no divine right of kings; the kings and parliaments exist solely to protected the rights of the governed to pursue life, liberty, and happiness with the consent of the governed. Without this consent, or, if the sovereign choose to abridge these divine-backed rights, then they lose their just powers. This idea might have been the motivating factor for Madison's remark in Federalist No. 51 that "In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself."

But exactly how many people was the "all" intended to encompass? There are two readings possible. If we remove this Declaration from its historical context then the all is an undifferentiated universal for all persons who were creating by the Creator. Since the source of the justification for this radical document was the divine endowment within each person, then all persons who were created would qualify as needing their consent to be governed. The second reading, in contrast, is historicist in its framing. The text did not use the word "person" it used the word "men." Men and man are universalizable only to the general, literate, propertied male population of that day. Being divinely created is not sufficient for rights for many of them believed that women, as well as men, were divinely created and chose to use the narrower language of men rather than persons. In fact, these inalienable rights were denied to women and slaves at the time.

Today we like the first reading because their limited universal of "man" has expanded into our universal "person." Thus, all persons need to consent to be governed for a government to have just powers to rule. We support the text of the Declaration without being bound by the meaning of the words as it was written.

CATO offers that future justices ought to be committed to Rehnquist's provision of protecting state's right as an end in itself and to . Fortunately Madison provides a warning against a Rehnquist-Scalia axis of state's rights as ends in themselves (a popular position for the "constitution-in-exile" camp).

James Madison belabors this point in the Federalist Papers:
Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was the American Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that the government of the individual States, that particular municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of power, and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty? We have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old World, that the people were made for kings, not kings for the people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New, in another shape — that the solid happiness of the people is to be sacrificed to the views of political institutions of a different form? It is too early for politicians to presume on our forgetting that the public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of government whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object. . . . [A]s far as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every good citizen must be, Let the former be sacrificed to the latter.
Madison provides what he considers to be an easy rhetorical question for his readers: "...was the precious blood of thousands spilt, not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that the government of the individual States, that particular municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of power, and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty?" I added to the emphasis to highlight that Madison juxtaposes state's rights as ends in themselves to state's rights for the purpose of guaranteeing rights. As I wrote earlier state's rights suffered a huge blow during Reconstruction and then again during the New Deal when it became plainly evident that the states were not protecting individual liberties. Madison's radicalism did not diminish once the Declaration was written; indeed he offered that the motivating principles behind the constitution were more important than the historical forms by which these principles manifested: "It is too early for politicians to presume on our forgetting that the public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of government whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object." The teleology of government is the protection of the people; its power the people's consent.

Madison would not endorse the ultimate thrust of late Chief Justice's quixotic and reactionary opening to United States v. Lopez (1995): "We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers" which he subsequently expanded on in United States v. Morrison (2000). "The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local. . . . Indeed, we can think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims." Rehnquist is incorrect; the framers of the various amendments of the Constitution distinguished between the national and the local only if the local was promoting the aims of the American government: individual rights. In fact, their fear was that when the states were protecting the inalienable rights of properties men, the Federal government's intervention into the matter would threaten rather than enhance the rights of the persons involved. However, Rehnquist's failing on this issue is not due to the fact that he missed the underlying principles of constitutional law--he was indeed a very bright man possessing both a curious mind and a voracious intellectual appetite--; rather his failing was that he didn't believe in alienable individual rights in the first place. In 1976 Rehnquist penned a classic statement of legal positivism when wrote in the Texas Law Review that: "If such a society adopts a constitution and incorporates in that constitution safeguards for individual liberty, these safeguards indeed do take on a generalized moral rightness or goodness . . . neither because of any intrinsic worth nor because of any unique origins in someone's idea of natural justice but instead simply because they have been incorporated in a constitution by the people." This clearly goes against the underlying principles of life in the constitution and underscores why Rehnquist believed the constitution was dead.

In contrast to all the bad jurisprudence of Rehnquist and CATO, Jack Balkin affirms the living constitution on Slate. You should read the entirety of this piece. He begins by writing "The framers expected that their language, not their intentions, would control future generations. They created, in John Marshall's words, a "constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs" and continues his argument eloquently from there to prove the following statement:
The living Constitution is central to the American constitutional tradition, so central that even its loudest critics actually believe in it. Many Americans fail to realize how much of our current law and institutions are inconsistent with the original expectations of the founding generation. A host of federal laws securing the environment, protecting workers and consumers—even central aspects of Social Security—go beyond the original understanding of federal power, not to mention most federal civil rights laws that protect women, racial and religious minorities, and the disabled from private discrimination. Independent federal agencies like the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Federal Communications Commission would all be unconstitutional under the original understanding of the Constitution. Presidential authority would be vastly curtailed—including all the powers that the Bush administration regularly touts. Indeed, most of the Bush administration's policy goals—from No Child Left Behind to national tort reform—would be beyond federal power.
All of the things Balkin enumerates here are goals to which we are committed as Americans in the 21st century. A dead constitution is insufficient as a governing tool given modern needs and subsequent historical experiences. The Constitution, then, like the Declaration of Independence, is not a source text from which we derive original meaning. It is like, rather, a philosophical work, whose construction, reconstruction, and interpretation is meant to tell us as much about ourselves as about the meaning of the authors. The Constitution is inspirational as guiding force, not as a legalistic commandment. By causing us to think about claims of justice and representation in a structured manner, the Constitution aids democratic life by grounding us in common principles, not first ones.



Tuesday, October 25, 2005
 
Not Acceptable Bush

From the ACLU on detainees who were killed during interrogation. I really wish right now that we weren't fighting a war. I wanted Bush to sign an executive order immediately authorizing the arrest of any American civilians or military officers/ personnel involved in torture. I then want him to authorize the Solicitor General and the US Attorney-General's office to immediately begin prosecuting them in civilian courts. All persons convicted are to be sentenced to life in prison without parole. In some cases, they should be turned over to the governments' whose nationals were murdered for justice. That's what should be done. If I were president right now, everyone involved from the Seals to the OGAs would be done for. (OGA, an acronym for Other Government Agency" refers to the CIA)

The records reveal the following facts:

A 27-year-old Iraqi male died while being interrogated by Navy Seals on April 5, 2004, in Mosul, Iraq. During his confinement he was hooded, flex-cuffed, sleep deprived and subjected to hot and cold environmental conditions, including the use of cold water on his body and hood. The exact cause of death was “undetermined” although the autopsy stated that hypothermia may have contributed to his death. Notes say he “struggled/ interrogated/ died sleeping.” Some facts relating to this case have been previously reported. (In April 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld authorized the use of “environmental manipulation” as an interrogation technique in Guantánamo Bay. In September 2003, Lt. Gen. Sanchez also authorized
this technique for use in Iraq. Although Lt. Gen. Sanchez later rescinded
the September 2003 techniques, he authorized “changes in environmental quality”
in October 2003.)


An Iraqi detainee (also described as a white male) died on January 9, 2004, in Al Asad, Iraq, while being interrogated by “OGA.” He was standing, shackled to the top of a door frame with a gag in his mouth at the time he died. The cause of death was asphyxia and blunt force injuries. Notes summarizing the autopsies record the circumstances of death as “Q by OGA, gagged in standing restraint.” (Facts in the autopsy report appear to match the previously reported case of Abdul Jaleel.)

A detainee was smothered to death during an interrogation by Military Intelligence on November 26, 2003, in Al Qaim, Iraq. A previously released autopsy report, that appears to be of General Mowhoush, lists “asphyxia due to smothering and chest compression” as the cause of death and cites bruises from the impact with a blunt object. New documents specifically record the circumstances of death as “Q by MI, died during interrogation.”

A detainee at Abu Ghraib Prison, captured by Navy Seal Team number seven, died on November 4, 2003, during an interrogation by Navy Seals and “OGA.” A previously released autopsy report, that appears to be of Manadel Al Jamadi, shows that the cause of his death was “blunt force injury complicated by compromised respiration.” New documents specifically record the circumstances of death as “Q by OGA and NSWT died during interrogation.”

An Afghan civilian died from “multiple blunt force injuries to head, torso and extremities” on November 6, 2003, at a Forward Operating Base in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. (Facts in the autopsy report appear to match the previously reported case of Abdul Wahid.)A 52-year-old male Iraqi was strangled to death at the Whitehorse detainment facility on June 6, 2003, in Nasiriyah, Iraq. His autopsy also revealed bone and rib fractures, and multiple bruises on his body. (Facts in the autopsy report appear to match the previously reported case of Nagm Sadoon Hatab.)




 
The Changing Dimensions of Warfare

News24 had an interesting article triumphantly entitled: "World a Safer Place." While it would be wrong for me to compare this proclamation to Neville Chamberlain's ill-fated proclamation that the would of the 1930s would have "peace in [their] time" as he showcased the infamous Munich peace agreement with the German government, I believe that the conclusions of the news article may be unwarranted.

The article begins by stating "a study issued on Monday paints a surprising picture of war and peace in the 21st century: Armed conflicts have declined by more than 40% since 1992, and genocide and human rights abuses have plummeted around the world. The only form of political violence that appears to be getting worse is international terrorism - a serious threat that nonetheless kills extraordinarily few people per year compared to wars, it said." Naturally, this is good news because "there has been a shift away from the huge wars of the 1950s, '60s and '70s where million-strong armies faced each other with conventional weapons. "The average war today tends to be a very small, low intensity conflict, fought with ill-trained troops, small arms and light weapons, often very brutal, with lots of civilians killed - but the absolute numbers of people being killed are ... much, much smaller than they were before," he said."

The article continued: "The number of international crises, often harbingers of war, fell by more than 70% between 1981 and 2001, the report said. Notwithstanding the genocides in Rwanda in 1994 and the Bosnian city of Srebrenica in 1995, mass killings because of religion, ethnicity or political beliefs plummeted by 80% between the 1988 high point and 2001, it said." (emphasis mine)

This article, in summarizing the report, gets a few key details absolutely correct. First, major power war--where two or more major powers fight each other on the battle field--has decreased by 100% since 1945. For various reasons debated by scholars, no one expects any of the European states to start a major, nor, do any other states seem particlarly inclined to militarily threaten any European, former Soviet, or American state with annihilation. War between democracies and major industrialized countries (with the possible execption of India and Pakistan) today seems so improbable as to be impossible. Second, convential war between most of the non-great power states also seems to be relatively decline. I can agree with that: very few states seem posed to attack each other with convential national forces. Third, international crises between states also seems to have decreased.

The report, however, obscures the major sources of instability in the international system today.

One, most the factors that cause wars are not viewed as international, but rather as either regional or domestic. For instance, if an underdeveloped state moves into a period of economic insolvency, civil war, or violent political conflict, the factors that cause these conflicts are seen as endongeous to the state or region and not as international. International organizations, sometimes at the behest of their most powerful sponsors and sometimes on their intiatives, use their leverage and limited means of pressure to force internal change within these emerging states. Since the relative coercive power of non-state international actors are highest due times of crises in these states, these actors attach strings to their aid and assistance. Two examples will help toward illustrating my point. The first example is of the tatics available to international financial institutions. The second involves the corrosive effects of changing prices on the international market for countries that have one main export.

There have been many examples of postcolonial states weakening due to economic "shock therapy" as a part of the structural adjustment programs as applied by international financial organizations such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. John Rapley, in Understanding Development: Theory and Practice in the Third World, denotes that the idea of structural adjustment, a theory of economic development, “embodies the goals of neoclassical [capitalism]: it places the market at the center stage, assigns the state a secondary role in development, and puts it faith in the potential of unfettered individual initiative, creativity, and ingenuity.” Structural adjustment programs, he continues, attempt to remove obstacles to efficient markets and include as remedial policies: “fiscal austerity and disinflationary policies, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, trade liberalization, currency devaluation, and the general deregulation of the economy, including financial and labor-market deregulation.” (66)

The structural adjustment programs often have four features. The first concerns currency devaluation. The second aspect is economic and coroparate privatization. Oftentimes the government owns many of the companies in these countries, especially the companies that deal with natural resources. The aspect of structural adjustment programes usually involve the removal of industry subsidies and a trimming of the workforce, creating more unemployments. Finally, the last aspect of these programme are the international withholding of monies granted to the regime from more developed country until some sort of political instutional change occurs under the banner of democratization

International financial institutions, like the IMF and the World Bank, only offer their assistance when a state is finacially bankrupt. A bankrupt state, in not being able to pay back its loans, demostrates its fundamental weakness: it does not have sufficent instutitonal strenght to extract resources from its territory and pay its bills. The neoclassist insistence on further weakening the state- to its influence from the market- with the often correlated policy of forcing institutional redesign puts developing states in a fragile position in two ways. The first is that when insitutionally weak governments who have a difficult time paying their bills retreat from the economy, the government has less ability to raise money to continue to function, even if the businesses and privatized sectors of the economy become more liberal. The second source of fragility is that oppositonal political groups attempt to capitalize on the sitting governments bad situation and make a bid for power. (This bid needn't necessarily be violent.) The sitting regime, in watching its opposition make a bid for power and by having its national markets removed from its purview, begins more and more to calculate strategies for holding onto political power, even if that involves an extralegal attempt to snuff out the opposition through poltical and military crackdowns on the opposition and their civilian sources of support. This changing calcus and deteriorating political-economic situation, given that it did not result from an invasion or some great power international crises, does not factor into the report's description of warfare, or, is classified, mistakenly, as a civil war when in fact the conditions for the war stem from the international system.

Another example of the international system incentivizing and creating a climate of war and violent political conflict is the changing price of certain goods on the international markets that form the majority of a particular country's exports. For instance, if a state in Asia or Africa heavily relies on one export, like say sugar or coffee, and the international market drives the price of coffee way down, then the country may find itself in dire financial straights. This may fundamentally deprive the regime of its main source of funding, effectively crippling the power of the state to continue to admininister control over its territory. The financial crisis and political crisis that the state may later find itself in is likely to be viewed as a factor internal to that state and not as emmanating from the international market sytem.

Two, the lack of convential warfare means that civilians, and not soldiers, are more likely to be the target of military and political action. The article noted: "The average war today tends to be a very small, low intensity conflict, fought with ill-trained troops, small arms and light weapons, often very brutal, with lots of civilians killed - but the absolute numbers of people being killed are ... much, much smaller than they were before," he said." When larger states, regional actors, and local governments attempt to end low-intensity conflicts, like terrorism and insurgencies, these powers often find themselves targeting civilians in an effort to deter civilians from supporting and harboring the irregulars who fight these assymetric wars by making contined civilain support of these belligerents costly. Sometimes these wars have a welfare component of winning hearts and minds, but oftentimes the more powerful side targets the civilian base of support to "drain the sea" of support for the insurgents and terrorists. American military strategy in Vietnam and the Phillipines are excellent historical examples of this. Since the article predicts that more wars in the future will have this assymetric componet, we are going to see more wars where civilians are targeted as part of the war aims.

Political actions, like economic sanctions, also are a form of politics that chooses civilians as its principle aim, but do not count as warfare or international conflict. Sanctions are often seen as low-cost, easy methods of coercion. However, the cost of civilian life is often high. Jay Gordon, in an article entitled "When Intent Makes All the Difference in the World: Economic Sanctions on Iraq and the Accusation of Genocide" in the Yale Journal of Human Rights and Development, wrote of the high civilian death rate under the sanctions in Iraq.
Prior to the Persian Gulf War, Iraq had one of the highest standards of living in the Arab world. The Iraqi government had invested heavily in social and economic development, both before and during the Iran-Iraq war. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had made impressive strides in health, education, and development of the infrastructure. In 1980, the Iraqi government initiated a program to reduce infant and child mortality rates by more than half within ten years. The result was a rapid and steady decline in childhood mortality. Prior to the Gulf War, there was good vaccination coverage; the majority of women received some assistance from trained health professionals during delivery; the majority of the adult population was literate; there was nearly universal access to primary school education; the vast majority of households had access to safe water and electricity; and there was a marked decline in infant mortality rate, and in the under-five mortality rate. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), ninety percent of the population had access to safe water.
Jay Gordon then offers that the Defense Intelligence Agency, tasked with denoting the likely effects of a given policy, predicted the catastrophic effect of the sanctions regimes.
In the fall of 1999, a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) memorandum entitled, “Iraq Water Treatment Vulnerabilities” was declassified. The January 18, 1991 document focused on how the impending air war would undermine Iraq’s infrastructure:

1. Iraq depends on importing specialized equipment and somechemicals to purify its water supply, most of which is heavily mineralized and frequently brackish to saline.

2. With no domestic sources of both water treatment replacementparts, Iraq may continue attempts to circumvent United Nationssanctions to import these vital commodities.

3. Failing to secure supplies will result in a shortage of puredrinking water for much of the population. This could lead toincreased incidences, if not epidemics, of disease and to certainpure-water-dependent industries becoming incapacitated, including . . pharmaceuticals and food processing . . .

4. Although Iraq is already experiencing a loss of water treatment capability, it probably will take at least six months (to June 1991) before the system is fully degraded.

5. Unless water treatment supplies are exempted from the UN sanctions for humanitarian reasons, no adequate solution exists forIraq’s water purification dilemma, since no suitable alternatives,including looting supplies from Kuwait, sufficiently meet Iraqi needs. . . .

.. . .11. Iraq’s rivers also contain biological materials, pollutants, andare laden with bacteria. Unless the water is purified with chlorine, epidemics of such diseases as cholera, hepatitis, and typhoid could occur. . .

. . . .14. . . . Recent reports indicate the chlorine supply is critically low. Its importation has been embargoed, and both main productionplants either had been shut down for a time or have beenproducing minimal outputs because of the lack of importedchemicals and the inability to replace parts. . .

. . . .20. Iraqi alternatives. Iraq could try convincing the United Nations or individual countries to exempt water treatment supplies from sanctions for humanitarian reasons. It probably also is attempting to purchase supplies by using some sympathetic countries as fronts. If such attempts fail, Iraqi alternatives are not adequate fortheir national requirements.

21. Various Iraqi industries have water treatment chemicals and equipment on hand if they have not already been consumed orbroken. Iraq possibly could cannibalize parts or entire systemsfrom power to higher priority plants, as well as divert chemicals, such as chlorine. However, this capacity would be limited and temporary.

Thus, the DIA anticipated not only the damage to the infrastructureand water system, but anticipated as well that Iraq would be unable to takeeffective measures to provide potable water afterward. The DIAthen anticipated the epidemics and loss of life that would follow.
What we saw, Gordon concludes, is the DIA willingly supported a policy designed to kill massive numbers of civilians as a direct cosequence, rather than an incidental effect of, said policy. We are going to see more policies similar to sanctions and counterinsurgency tactics become the main methods of detering states and containing threats as the 21st century unfolds. Though we are unlikely to see great power conflict, that doesn't mean there won't be wars against enemy populations going on without our knowledge in places like Colombia, Iraq, the Phillipines, and Afghanistan.

Three, and finally, even though the study would not report them as such, "regional" and "internal" conflicts are still international. The increasing incentives that international organizations have to coerce and weaken states, and the increasing incentives of international actors--from large states to international terrorist organizations like Al Qaida-- to target civilians means that our triumphalist tone concerning conflict in the international system is premature and should be more discreet.



 
Rosa Parks Dead

As you undoubtedly know, Rosa Parks has passed away. The symbolic effects of courageous actions quietly sparked a revolution; her backbone buttressed the faith of many. Until the day of her death she emphasized that she was just one of many.

Excellent words found at the Christian Science Monitor and in the comments of the Guardian.



Monday, October 24, 2005
 
How the Door Hit the Conservatives (and Libertarians) on the Way Out

Andrew Seal has some great commentary on two posts by Ann Althouse and Bainbridge covering an article by "John Tierney talking about what--or who--keeps conservatives out of academia." That's right. I am an academician hopefully about to comment on a comment concerning comments about a new article article discussing conservatives in academia. This should be right up there with Habermas writing an article in an edited book on a comment by a German theologian on Max Horkheimer. At best, we are going to be thrice observed.

It all started with Ann Althouse's commentary on the New York Times' select article by John Tierney. He posited, as far we can tell, that there are four often stated reasons why conservatives don't get tenure at universities. One, conservatives do not value knowledge for its own sake. Two, conservatives do not care about the social good. Three, conservatives are too greedy to work for professors' wages. Four, conservatives are too dumb to get tenure.

There all ready seems to be a problem in attempting to infer characteristics about an undefined population, named "conservatives" for rhetorical power. Thus, my cheeky title of "how the door hit conservatives on the way out"--in the the vein of all the recent "How X Did Y" or "How X Succeeds and When Y Fails" titles now ubiquitous in bookstores--is amusing precisely because we don't know who the conservatives are, where they are leaving from, and why they are leaving (i.e. whether its voluntary or involuntary).

Althouse, not needing to define or operationalize her concepts, continues: "Tierney rejects all of that, and blames the disparity on 'the structure of academia, where decisions about hiring are made by small independent groups of scholars'," and begins quoting Tierney who wrote:

They're subject to the law of group polarization, derived from studies of juries and other groups.

"If people are engaged in deliberation with like-minded others, they end up more confident, more homogenous and more extreme in their beliefs," said Cass Sunstein, a law professor at the University of Chicago. "If you have an English or history department that leans left, their interactions will push them further left."

Once liberals dominate a department, they can increase their majority by voting to award tenure to like-minded scholars. As liberals dominate a field, conservatives' work comes to be seen as fringe scholarship.

There seems to be another immediate problem here (besides the small factor of not knowing really who were are talking about). Liberals apparently, a priori, decide that a fellow faculty member's research sucks because of political affiliation? That's a big charge from the conservative wing who could usually be counted on to say that hiring ought to be based on the merits of a candidate and not any particular group characteristic. There seems to be four factors wrong in asserting that conservatives are being discriminated against per se. One, there does not seem to be a large pool of "conservative" applicants who are denied tenure whom can point out discrimination in the hiring process, or that the reasonably informed observer can identify. Systematic discrimination is by definition very observable. Segregation was not a contested claim, it was an easily observable fact of life. We could see actual discrimination there. Two, the argument seems to lack specificity about which universities are discriminating against conservatives. Are we talking about a correlation between faculty denied tenure at Princeton and voting affiliation? This is important to specify because some institutions, like Princeton, traditionally don't grant tenure to that many people, conservative or not. In fact, many of the top political scientists in the field now, somewhere between 20 and 40 percent, were denied tenure at their first university. Three, there is no specification about which fields these decisions are being made in. The honest to goodness truth is that in some academic fields the job market sucks. Four, this doesn't include how cordial and chummy the supposed conservative is with his or her colleagues. Did the person make meager ideological difference an uncomfortable issue with some of the faculty? That seems to be relevant if one is being given a job for life.

Ann contextualizes her own criticism and demonstrates her dearth of knowledge concerning academia when she self-righteously concludes: "That sounds accurate to me. Tierney concludes that the phenomenon ultimately hurts liberals in the political sphere because they can't draw on the ideas of liberals in academia, who have veered too far left to produce ideas that are appealing to American voters." Can I get a show of hands for people who believe that academics outside of policy studies and the social sciences are attempting to "produce ideas that are appealing to American voters"? I'm sure that the history of Kenya, or, of religious practices in an Indonesian village are aimed at the American electorate. Thanks, Ann. Don't let the door hit you on the way out.

Steven Bainbridge, actually being a law professor, has something intelligent to add. Bainbridge writes:

In my experience, it thus is a lot harder to get somebody hired than it is to block them from being hired. The process isn't as explicit as the blackballing scene in Animal House, but the law school hiring process is just as weighted against hiring. (And I mean hiring anybody, regardless of political affiliation.) Any opposition (for whatever reason) therefore is usually enough, absent a very strongly committed pro-hiring faction. In most cases, a candidate's best chance of surviving the winnowing process is for someone on the committee to become the candidate's champion. The champion will pull the candidate's resume out of the slush pile and make sure it gets flagged for close review. Because most law schools lack a critical mass of libertarian and conservative faculty members, however, there is nobody predisposed to pulling conservative candidates' AALS forms out of the slush pile (and a fair number of folks inclined, whether consciously or subconsciously, to bury them) Applicants with conservative lines on their resume -- an Olin fellowship, Federalist Society membership, or, heaven help you, a Scalia clerkship -- thus tend to be passed over no matter how sterling the rest of their credentials may be. In contrast, the latest left-leaning prodigy from Harvard or Yale has a mentor at one of those schools who makes calls to his/her buddies and ideological soulmates at other law schools. The recipients of those calls then flag the prodigy's file, giving them a critical leg-up in the process. Law school hiring tends to be driven by the self-perpetuating network of left-leaning senior faculty.

Bainbridge offers a new hypothesis: libertarians and conservatives often lack the faculty sponsors necessary to secure highly competitive job slots. The fact that academia is a professional association, whose tenured members get to determine the rules and practices of the trade and its reproduction, limits the number of jobs available, Bainbridge argues, and thus has the effect of accidentally discriminating against libertarians and conservatives. Bainbridge's distinction are certainly much better than Althouse's by creating a slightly less concrete mechanism, the machine, rather than the liberal [who for Ann is waiting to ding every conservative.] Bainbridge's issue is that his argument doesn't sufficiently distinguish between conservatives, libertarians, and "liberal" rejected faculty given the small number of persons actually hired. The lack of a direct casual mechanism to select conservatives and libertarians as such means that our only response is "tough" or "deal." Don't let the door hit you on your way out either; trust me its nothing personal.

Andrew Seal gets past all the question-begging and goes directly to the heart of the matter: "But the question they all skip around is, why were the liberals there in the first place? Why is academia a magnet for liberals? They may be entrenched now, but it's not like the university just now took a turn to the left. Well, if you're Steven Levitt (the freakonomist), the place you look is to incentives. Holding all things equal, what incentives do liberals have for adopting the academic life?" His observation that liberals didn't just start to dominate the university is apt; in fact, we have historical evidence that conservatives may have dominated the university at the turn of the 19th/20th century. It would be interesting to note what changed.

Well, why do people choose a career? Andrew continues, I'm going to be reductive and say it's for one of three reasons--to gratify a passion for one's work, to achieve renown/influence or to make money.

Now, just hang on a second, this isn't going where you're thinking. I don't think (not making) money is the principal factor in turning liberals to academia and conservatives away. And, like passion for one's work, it is not limited to liberals. What I do think is a factor--the factor--is influence.

There are two ways of influencing--direct and indirect. (I suppose this is akin to hard and soft power, but for the sake of a future post that relates to this, I will use direct and indirect influence.) You can try to directly influence the circumstances, or you can attempt to influence the flow of ideas that will bring about the circumstances. I think that it is accurate to say that conservatives have historically favored direct influence and liberals have favored indirect influence. That's not a value judgment, it is supposed to be descriptive.

Seal then goes on to distinguish between the fact that, for him, conservatives target conditions (direct influence) and liberals offer ideas that shape conditions (indirect influence). That seems to me to be too clever by half for a reason why we find more "liberals" than "conservatives" in academia.

The idea that no one wants to discuss is: why is it an issue about the ideological preferences of a faculty member or a faculty body? Moreover, how do we go about measuring any given person's preference?

One answer is that the scholarship suffers from too much ideological agreement. We know that's not true. The preponderance of "liberal" academics at an institution seem irrelevant because the academic peer-reviewed journals largely shape the profession of academia. (Law reviews, I believe, are the exception for they are not peer reviewed.) The editors who run the journals are distinct from the faculty who grant tenure in the sense that they don't perfectly overlap. Not every tenured faculty member will head a journal. Moreover, most journals have anonymous readers for articles who aren't selected for their partisanship but for their methodological diversity.

Another answer concerns the brainwashing of the students. No person who has been to college or university recently will tell that they and their peers were blank slates waiting for liberal professors to remake. We need a more complex account than that. Oftentimes students take classes with their own agendas in mind to challenge professors or to mock them. Students argue about their politics, the professor's politics, and the class readings outside the classroom. Critical thinking is not partisan-bound. Students, Republican and Democrat alike, have benefited from taking classes and from talking to one another. In fact, four years of college seems to produce more political apathy and dissatisfaction than anything else.

In short, the debate over professors political affiliations as either a proxy for hiring diversity or regarding concerns over brainwashing undergrads is a load of crap is ever heard of one. The debate is not only pointless, but it's obnoxious too.




 
Confessions

I went to Church Sunday morning at the University Rockefeller Memorial Chapel. The service was excellent and I think I shall go back. It is ecumenical, which the Chapel defines as "specifically Christian, and designed to be welcoming to people of Christian denominations." Since my particular mode of worship is non-denominational Christian I felt very at home there. What was very interesting and disturbing this morning, for those of you who could care less about my church life, was the corporate prayer of confession which I shall replicate, in full, here. It is usually the sermon where the reality of sin and shame are made manifest for me. Here, a corporate prayer serves as an argument against the violence of disunity. As usual, I shall offer what I think the meaning of the prayer is.

"Merciful God, in your gracious presence we confess our sin and the sin of this world. Although Christ is among us as our peace, we are a people divided against ourselves as we cling to the values of a broken world. The profit and pleasures we pursue lay waste the land and pollute the seas. The fears and jealousies that we harbor set neighbor against neighbor and nation against nation. We abuse your good gifts of imagination and freedom, intellect and reason, and have turned them into bonds of oppression. Lord, have mercy upon us. Help us, forgive us, and set us free to serve you in the world as agents of your reconciling love in Jesus Christ. Amen."

The textual interplay of theology and description stirred my heart this morning. In my time away from church I had not only forgotten the universal nature of the gift of grace and salvation posed, but I had also forgotten the deeply pacific and united nature of Christ and His Church. The text here argues that though we have peace in Christ, and, consequently are made one through Him, "we are a people divided against ourselves." The 'we' here clearly refers to the Church universal--all Christians--who, the text argues, are divided against ourselves. The body catholic no longer is operating as one, unified in purpose and mind, the prayer argues, due to our clinging to the "values of a broken world." Rather than the mind of Christ--and I am reminded here of Paul's exhortation in Phillipians (chapter 2 I believe) to "Let the mind which is in Christ Jesus be yours as well, that He, who was the very form of God, did not regard equality with God a thing to be grasped, but rather took the form of a servant, humbled Himself, and emptied Himself even to death, death on a cross"-- the prayer argues that we have adopted the values of a broken world.

Now before moving on I should probably take a moment to discuss this passage from Phillipians briefly. Something about the attitude of Christ caused Him to humble himself and to empty Himself. Scholars have debated precisely what it meant for Christ to empty Himself, and I shall not go into that here. It is rather that Christ was the form of God. His very nature or content, which seems to be consistent with Hellenistic usage of the term, was that of God, and yet, equality with the Divine was not something to "be grasped at" or reached out for. I digress.

The values of the broken world do not just seem to be the values that come from the world that is broken, but rather the pursuit and presence of these values break the world. What is suggested by the invocation of the image of the world being broken? The concept suggested is the oppositional concept of wholeness, or unity. Thus, the argument of the prayer is not just that the unity of the mind of Christ is shattered when the body catholic divides against itself; no, the argument has more implications than that. Embracing the values of the broken world breaks both the church and the world, shattering their pre-existing primordial unity. Internalizing the values of the broken world, then, is an act of violence.

The concept of violence is the message inchoate within this prayer. "The profit and pleasures we pursue lay waste the land and pollute the seas. The fears and jealousies that we harbor set neighbor against neighbor and nation against nation." Pursuit of profit and pleasure, and, the harboring of fears and jealousies are all acts of violence that devastate the land and the seas, and dissolve the bonds of community among neighbors and nations. The shattering of the unity of the church unleashes the decaying effects of "our sin and the sin of this world." All of creation, both natural and social, groans under the weight and blemish of sin. The world is dying and the church is divided.

My first thought was that this was the pacificity of the Gospel emerging in the prayer until I realized that the argument was not against war or jealousies as such--another prayer later was very explicit in expression our Christian concern for civilians in harms' way as well as the soldiers who die even as I write this--; rather, this corporate prayer was about the destructiveness of violence unchecked and unopposed by Christian unity. Evil prospers, so the adage goes, when good persons do nothing. The good's forbearance becomes the complicitous action that accommodates evil. Evil prospers, this prayer adds, when Christians are divided.

Let us then consider the final lines. "We abuse your good gifts of imagination and freedom, intellect and reason, and have turned them into bonds of oppression. Lord, have mercy upon us. Help us, forgive us, and set us free to serve you in the world as agents of your reconciling love in Jesus Christ." The gifts of being created in the image of God--male and female God created them, in their image God created them--rest in our mental capacities of "imagination and freedom, intellect and reason." This seems like a distinctly 20th century (philosophical) liberal tradition weaving its way into the text; but the argument holds nonetheless. Embracing division, internalizing violence into the body catholic, ravishes the land, destroys our connections to each other (in nations, as neighbors) and the tools of our basic mental facilities that cannot be materially constrained of "imagination and freedom, intellect and reason" are turned against us.

Violence is a perversion of all, to our most essential mental capacities, as well as the destruction of a primal unity of the world and the Church. In the words of Heidegger, this prayer stipulates "Only a God can save us" and leaves us at the moment where we pray for forgiveness to remove us from a cycle of violence, decay, death, destruction, and despair. This salvation doesn't immediately right the balance of wrong we have created. No, instead it liberates us from the cycle of pain whose reincarnations are simply an eternal recurrence of the same--shattered unity, broken homes, dismantled nations, devastated environments, dead mothers, missing fathers, murdered sisters, and butchered brothers--and frees us to serve "[God] in the world as agents of [God's] reconciling love in Jesus Christ."

God in Your mercy, hear our prayers.




 
I apologize for no posts on Sunday. The paper I had to write prevented me from doing so. But we shall be updating for all the rest of this week so stay tuned and keep leaving your comments. They are greatly appreciated.

I have enable a feature which should make email posts to other people easier.



Saturday, October 22, 2005
 
Unforeseen but Unsurprising, II: Bush's Tactical Situation

The Bush administration continues to fumble their second nomination to the Supreme Court, White House Counsel Harriet Miers. Over the past three weeks since she's been nominated, Miers has been portrayed as: a hardworking moderate, a trailblazer for women in the field of law, a person of impeccable morality and immutable opinions, a potential judge who interprets the law strictly, a person who believes in and supports stare decisis particularly as it pertains to Roe, a pro-life evangelical Christian who will overturn Roe, a person whose views on Roe are unknown, an outsider the judicial process, and a person intimately familiar with constitutional questions. Unsurprisingly, not all of these images of Miers coincide; in fact, some of them are mutually exclusive.

In my first post on the issue, I offered that the main reason Bush nominated Miers was due to her pro-business tendencies rather than her moral positions. The second reason I believe that Bush nominated Miers was due to the tactical situation the Senate put him in.

The Senate Republicans

In analyzing Bush's tactical situation before the Miers nominated, we find that many Senate Republicans were not eager to fight a battle over a hard line conservative. The so-called Gang of 14 Senate moderates heavily signaled to Bush that they didn't want a nominee they would have to filibuster. A filibuster in the Senate would have given a green light to power-hungry and irresponsible members of the Republican caucus to invoke the "nuclear option"; this option would permit the 55 Senate Republicans to rewrite the rules on filibustering such that a simple majority would be sufficient to end a filibuster, effectively making the Senate chambers as majoritarian and capricious as the House of Representatives.

Tapscott's Copy Desk, a conservative ideologue if I ever saw one, makes the point most forcefully in an entry title "Memo to My Friends on the Right: Miers isn't the Issue; Weak-Kneed Senate GOP Leadership Is":

That point is this: As long as the Senate GOP leadership refuses to confront head-on the Democrats' abuse of the filibuster and end it, the Democrats have a veto if they choose to use it. And choose it they will for any nominee short of one with an undeniably perfect record - John Roberts - or one with no record at all, Harriet Miers. Bush knows all hell would break loose politically if he nominated a candidate from the Old Guard wing of the GOP who would satisfy the Senate Democrats. Such a move would likely spark a revolt among the GOP's conservative infrastructure (note, it's not just "the base"). The resulting Senate GOP majority of one or two and a paltry five or six in the House would mean Bush would twiddle his thumbs for the last two years of his White House residency.

Stingray, "a blog for salty Christians" (whatever that means), concurs on this point. After pointing out that the constitution, contra Jacob Levy and George Will, is not "some sort of rarefied Gnostic writing that only the initiated can understand. It is a simple, succinct document that any decently intelligent person can sort through and apply to real-world situations. We have had too much constitutional voodoo over the years with the Supreme Court finding all sorts of emanations and penumbras that would make the Founding Fathers slap their heads", he places the blame on the Senate Republicans for this nomination. (Side note: Without agreeing with his point that our constitutional interpretation should be limited by the opinions of those present at the creation of any given constitutional amendment, he is correct that the constitution doesn't require magic, ritual, or divination to understand.) Stingray continues: "Unfortunately, there is an influential mass of conservatives who are upset that Bush did not choose a fire-breathing conservative with extensive right-wing credentials like Michael Luttig, Janice Rogers Brown, or even Priscilla Owen. The real reason for Bush’s apparent shying away from such a controversial nominee...is not that he lacks the guts to fight, but rather that the Senate GOP leadership has their dresses over their heads and refuses to fight the Democrats over a filibuster."

To hammer home the point that for him the problem is the Senate and not Bush, Stingray maintains:

It all boils down to this: First, the Republican leadership ceded control of the Senate to 41 Democrats. Then, last spring, they effectively ceded control of the Senate to a group of 14 people. President Bush has good reason for not trusting the Republican leadership to do its job and force a simple majority vote on his nominees. Appointing a fully-credentialed conservative nominee would be like going into battle and having to depend on the French to win it for you.

Bush is not afraid of a fight. The first thing that he did after the Gang of 14 made its agreement was to re-submit the names of 10 nominees whom the Democrats had previously filibustered. Plus, he made John Bolton the recess appointment as United Nations Ambassador when the Senate was out of session. Previously, the Democrats had threatened to filibuster Bolton. The simple fact is that until the Senate Republican leadership does its job and returns the Senate to a majority rule, Bush will be forced to nominate stealth candidates for high positions. Conservatives are mostly happy with Roberts because he has such sterling credentials but, the truth is that we really do not know where he stands on such hot-button issues as abortion. We probably know, but he may end up being one of those who are personally against Roe v. Wade but will not vote to overturn it. The same thing goes for Harriet Miers. She has had an extremely successful career by any measure yet one of the reasons for Bush nominating her is that she has no paper trail or official public opposition to abortion.

I am happy with Harriet Miers because, to those of us who are politically and religiously active in Dallas, she is not an unknown quantity. She has proved herself to be a capable leader and extremely competent attorney who has important consensus-building skills (something that Scalia and Thomas unfortunately lack). However, if anyone is not happy with Bush’s choice, they need to look no further than the Republican Senate leadership to see where the blame lies. This is all about having power but refusing to use it. If the Republican Senate leadership is going to allow itself to be run by a mere 14 members, then perhaps we need new leadership.

The New Republic takes a slightly different approach and makes the claim that the conservative backlash against Bush has been building for some time. When Bush first came to power, remarks the New Republic through David Frum, "[Bush] was a new thing. Every conservative knew he was a blend and was going to reach out to new constituencies. What the old coalition was going to get was a tax cut and judges. ... But the tax cut has turned out not to be a very valuable thing. Because of the deficits, this tax cut is not going to be permanent. Now here [with Miers] is the other most important thing he was going to do for conservatives, and he didn't do it." After so many betrayals, the true conservatives in the Republican coalition are ready to move on and are more than slightly peeved about the Miers nomination. The New Republic continues in its lofty authorial voice:

As conservatives tell it, the current insurrection has been building for some time. Bartlett, the mainstream conservative who has written and thought the most about Bush's disloyalty, tells the tale this way. In 2001, conservatives were deeply frustrated by low-level Bush heresies like the education bill. Then, September 11 silenced all dissent. In 2002, things got worse: An enormous agriculture bill, steel tariffs, a bloated budget, and a campaign finance bill that Bush once argued was unconstitutional. (Bartlett goes so far as to say Bush "violated his oath of office" by signing it.) Then, the Iraq war silenced all dissent. Next came the Medicare prescription-drug bill, which simultaneously funneled money to the pharmaceutical industry, expanded government more than any entitlement since LBJ, and violated the traditions, if not rules, of the House when the vote on the bill was held open for nearly three hours while conservative Republicans were bullied into reversing their no votes. "From my own point of view, the drug bill was the line in the sand," says Bartlett. "That's the point I decided to write a book and say this guy isn't one of us."
Other conservatives were also very angry. Then, the presidential campaign against John Kerry silenced all dissent.

We know the rest of the story: Absent a new war or domestic enemy like Kerry, Bush was suddenly exposed to the whole world, including the conservative movement, as a less-than-great president. Social Security reform fizzled. Bush signed an outrageously pork-laden transportation bill. He vacationed while New Orleans drowned. "What a lot of conservatives have always believed is that at least we know how to make the trains run," says a chastened Bartlett. "It was jarring that the MBA president wasn't a good manager." And then it was even more jarring that he wasn't such a good picker of Supreme Court justices, either. "Judges in the mold of Scalia and Thomas were the 'no new taxes' pledge of this presidency," says Frum. Scales fell from eyes, and the rebellion began.

The Senate Democrats

The Senate Democrats had even more reason to be less supportive of Bush. The Democrats have been, sadly, an opposition party without a true platform since the demise of Vice President Al Gore. Their rallying cry in 2002 and 2004 was that Bush "stole" the 2000 Elections. When the Republicans gained seats in the House and the Senate during the 2002 mid-term election, the Democrats were reduced to an anti-Bush platform of "Beat Bush in 2004." Passing over the centrist, moderate Democrat crazy-man Howard Dean for presidential nomination due to his "electability" Democrats could only be confused about the future of their political party after the narrow, but sufficiently decisive presidential and congressional Republican victories in 2004.

The Washington Post reports Howard Dean's angst over the judicial nominees: "In an interview, Dean said Democratic unity is essential in the upcoming battle and that the party "absolutely" should be prepared to filibuster -- holding unlimited debate and preventing an up-or-down vote -- Bush's next high court nominee, if he taps someone they find unacceptably ideological. He cited appellate court judges Priscilla R. Owen and Janice Rogers Brown as two who would be likely to trigger such opposition. "Those people are clearly not qualified to sit on the Supreme Court, and we're going to do everything we can to make sure they don't," he said. "If we lose, better to go down fighting and standing for what we believe in, because we will not win an election if the public doesn't think we'll stand up for what we believe in."" Was Howard Dean justified in castigating Judges Priscilla Owen and Janice Rogers Brown as "unacceptable"?

In the case of Judge Priscilla Owen the answer is yes. Wikipedia gives the down and dirty on Priscilla Owen nomination to the federal courts: "In 2001, Owen was nominated by President George W. Bush to her current post on a federal appellate court that hears appeals arising in several states, including Owen's home state of Texas. However, due to Senate disagreement over the issue of appointees considered to be extremely conservative, Democrats (who controlled the U.S. Senate at the time) did not let her come up for a vote. In 2003, after Republicans had taken the Senate back, Democrats filibustered her, along with her several other federal court nominees. Only in 2005, after Republicans picked up four more seats in the Senate did she again come up for a vote. Democratic Party senators had filibustered her nomination until May 2005 when a compromise was arranged by the "Gang of 14," which were a group of moderate senators from both the Republican and Democratic Parties. She was finally confirmed by a vote of 55 to 43 on May 25, 2005 and was sworn in on June 6, 2005. " Priscilla then was confirmed by strict party line votes after the deal to filibuster. The ideological nature, in the case, of the nomination seems to warrant concern.

What of Janice Rogers Brown? "She was nominated by President Bush on July 25, 2003 to be a United States Court of Appeals judge. The Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on her nomination on October 22 of that same year. After her name had passed out of committee and had been sent to the full Senate, there was a failed cloture vote on November 14, 2003. Bush renominated her on February 1, 2005.On April 21, the Senate Judiciary Committee again endorsed Brown and referred her name to the full Senate once more. On May 23, Senator John McCain announced an agreement between several moderate Republican and Democrat U.S. Senators, the Gang of 14, to ensure an up-or-down vote on Brown. On June 8, Brown was confirmed as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit by a 56-43 Senate vote. She received her commission on June 10. Although no official announcement of her swearing-in ceremony was made, she began hearing federal cases on September 8." Brown also seems to have been confirmed by party line vote plus one Democrat.

The White House perception is that John Roberts squeaked by due to his lack of record. Many Republicans and Democrats couldn't pin him down on key issues and thus, had, no real reason to oppose him. Thomas Sowell, in a column entitled "Harriet Who?" on 7 October 2005, wrote: "President Bush has taken on too many tough fights -- Social Security being a classic example -- to be regarded as a man who is personally weak....Before we can judge how the President played his hand, we have to consider what kind of hand he had to play. It was a weak hand -- and the weakness was in the Republican Senators." Thomas Sowell, trying to be optimistic about Miers, added (in only the way Sowell can):

Does this mean that Harriet Miers will not be a good Supreme Court justice if she is confirmed? It is hard to imagine her being worse than Sandra Day O'Connor -- or even as bad. The very fact that Harriet Miers is a member of an evangelical church suggests that she is not dying to be accepted by the beautiful people, and is unlikely to sell out the Constitution of the United States in order to be the toast of Georgetown cocktail parties or praised in the New York Times. Considering some of the turkeys that Republicans have put on the Supreme Court in the past, she could be a big improvement. We don't know. But President Bush says he has known Harriet Miers long enough that he feels sure.

For the rest of us, she is a stealth nominee. Not since The Invisible Man has there been so much stealth. That's not ideal by a long shot. But ideal was probably never in the cards, given the weak sisters among the Republicans' Senate "majority."

There is another aspect of this. The Senate Democrats huffed and puffed when Judge John Roberts was nominated but, in the end, he faced them down and was confirmed by a very comfortable margin. The Democrats cannot afford to huff and puff and then back down, or be beaten down, again. On the other hand, they cannot let a high-profile conservative get confirmed without putting up a dogfight to satisfy their left-wing special interest groups. Perhaps that is why some Democrats seem to welcome this stealth nominee. Even if she turns out to vote consistently with Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, the Democrats are off the hook with their base because they can always say that they had no idea and that she stonewalled them at the confirmation hearings.

The Senate Democrats can't afford to have another high-profile intellectual conservative, and the Senate Republicans don't want a fight. As a person who wanted either Janice Brown or Alberto Gonzales on the Court as the best possible Bush picks--unless I could vote for Charles Ogletree or Cass Sunstein--Miers is looking like she's not so bad so far. More on her qualifications another day. We still have a chance at Gonzales, though, if John Paul Stevens leaves the court.




 
Two More Dartmouth Blogs

I recently discovered two more Dartmouth blogs on the horizon yesterday.

The first is by Andrew Seal at http://www.symphonylog.com/seal/. The commentary is lively and witty. There is even a funny post about possible academic titles. I'll add it to the blog roll at some point. He even takes on the folks over at Agenda Gap on Free Speech.

The second is Julia Bernstein's http://outvox.blogspot.com/. She has an interesting representative middle class urban perspective.



 
Calling It Like It Is

In language I wouldn't possibly dare to duplicate, Connor on the The Little Green Blog gets it right in mocking Joe Malchow. Whoever this 'Connor' is I owe him/her a drink on me. If it is the Connor whom I met many years at my Coed Fraternity's (Alpha Theta) party, then I'll buy him two. Malchow sarcastically remarks in a post entitled "Promoting chastity is homophobic,":
Princeton students have started a new group that aims to promote chastity as a means of avoiding teenage pregnancy and the panoply of STDs. Anscombe, named after the English philosopher, has come under attack on the Princeton campus as being "anti-gay". According to CNN, some students oppose the group because they see it as "opposing homosexual relationships." And articles in the Daily Princetonian
routinely refer to the organization as one which promotes a "conservative sexual ethic".

Such accusations seem entirely unfounded, unless chastity has a 'don't ask, don't tell' policy I don't know about.

In a vulgar stream of consciousness that unfortunately leaves out the lesbian queer identity, Connor rightly takes Malchow to task getting directly to the heart of the matter with Malchow's remark [WARNING: Very Vulgar!]:


you're not going to be surprised that this group is fucking homophobic. it takes all of two clicks on their website to find the following preface to a big ol' heap of religious/pseudoscientific pile of bullshit bibliography: "We have not shied away from religious based arguments - or arguments advanced by religious leaders - as we are open to a good pluralism in which arguments from all vantage points that buttress familial and sexual life and ethics are welcomed."

let's go over the "religious based" (sic, motherfuckers, come on. i thought you went to princeton) argument against homosexuality: in leviticus 18, the bible gets to talking about whose nakedness to uncover and not to uncover, etc, and then drops a bomb in verse 22: "Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is abomination." now, that sounds like a pretty serious indictment. but rewind 7 books back to leviticus 11. in verse 10 he says: "And all that have not fins and scales in the seas, and in the rivers, of all that move in the waters, and of any living thing which is in the waters, they shall be an abomination unto you: they shall be even an abomination unto you; ye shall not eat of their flesh, but ye shall have their carcasses in abomination."

now, essentially, we have a normative position taken by leviticus, or God, or whoever, against "abomination." what constitutes abomination? for one thing, hot, gay assfucking. wait, i mean assfucking AND/OR the consumption of mussels, clams or other oceanic bivalves.

at this point it should be pretty clear that the "religious based" arguments against homosexuality are really fucking stupid, and we should move on. perhaps i am betraying my identity as a left-wing cultural elitist when i say that it's okay to go ahead and define any group or individual who gives the slightest bit of credence to the "religious based" arguments against homosexuality to be homophobic, as well as a gibbering fucking moron. this wouldn't be such a big deal, except there really AREN'T any other arguments against homosexuality. malchow likes to trip on its "biological abberance," but first of all, being biologically aberrant/engaging in "aberrant" behavior should not carry any kind of normative weight as far as whether society should confer rights on an individual. i could go on and state that we're seeing more and more results of homosexuality in the animal kingdom, etc., but i shouldn't have to.

is he really talking about people "hoisting" (or foisting) homosexuality on other people? what the fuck kind of bullshit is that? homosexuality is about a man or woman wanting to fuck an individual of the same gender. the only way that could be "foisted" on me is if a dude tried to rape me. going up to me and screaming "I THINK IT'S OKAY THAT I WANT TO FUCK OTHER DUDES IN THE ASS" isn't foisting shit, except for what should be an obvious statement of fact.




 
The Weekend Updates

I'll be taking Saturday and Sunday morning and early afternoon off. A combination of phone calls, homework, church, and making lunch will prevent me from having posts up for first thing in the morning. (Let's pretend that this wasn't a post.) However, by dinner time on Saturday and Sunday (6pm, Central Standard Time) I will have posts up for the day on each respective day.

Tell all your friends about the Dartmouth Observer. It's one way to start a debate.



Friday, October 21, 2005
 
South Koreans Looking for Door

Rumsfield apparently bristled when the South Koreans suggested that after fifty years it might be time to go. He retorted in the definition of spin:
The Republic of Korea, an impoverished and devastated nation over a half-century ago, now has one of the world's most powerful economies and is an important democracy with a large and increasingly capable armed force." These changing circumstances make it important for South Korea to take on a greater share of the burden for its own defense, Rumsfield said, but Koreans should not dismiss the value of U.S. support." The United States of America has invested the lives of a great many Americans in helping the Republic of Korea to be free," he said in a joint appearance with South Korean Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-Ung. "We are a part of this alliance at the request of the Republic of Korea's government," he added.
Right. So when someone asks you politely to leave their house, even if you fixed the broken windows, the front door, and installed the new lovely patio deck, do you respond: "Impoverish and broken I discovered you and your house, and now you are rich and well off. Do not diminish my labor and my work, I am here at your request"? Damned vampires; they always assume an invitation in for tea means until death do us part.

That being said, we have reduced the number of troops from 37, 000 to 12, 500. By the end of the year, that number should be down by another 8,000.



 
Transitional Justice as Reality TV: Saddam's Trials

In case you missed hearing about day one of the Hussein trial, the former Iraqi President refused to give his name to the judge. Apparently the entire nation that isn't consumed in the insurgency war abandoned cars as the gas pumps and stopped working to watch the trial of "Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti", deposed President of Iraq, and former Prime Minister. Like any truly innocent man, he apparently walked in looking old and confused, clutching a Koran. The drama was set to begin.
Instructed by the lead judge, Rizgar Mohammed Amin, to identify himself, he challenged the authority that presumed to put him on trial.

"Who are you? What does this court want?" he demanded. "I don't answer this so-called court, with all due respect, and I reserve my constitutional right as the president of the country of Iraq.

"I don't acknowledge the entity that authorises you, nor the aggression, because everything based on falsehood is falsehood."

Four times he was asked his name; four times he refused to give it. He asked to make a statement to the court and the judge answered that he should "relax" and promised he would have his chance to speak later. "You know me," Saddam replied. "You are an Iraqi and you know that I don't get tried."
Other sources reported that Saddam quipped: "If you are an Iraqi, then you already know who I am." There was reportedly also the time when he yelled at one of his fellow convictees when he referred to himself in relation to the "former Iraqi President." Saddam thundered: "I was not deposed!" Good stuff. It was amusing to see him invoke his constitutional rights as President. Didn't we change that constitution?

If you believed that the situation couldn't get more comical, in a headline worthy of the Onion, we find "Saddam's lawyer kidnapped." Is Nixon in charge of the prosecution team? Nine National (New Zealand) News reports:
The abduction came as Saddam's lawyers drew up a battle plan for his next court date after the stormy start of a landmark trial many fear will exacerbate Iraq's deep sectarian divide. A defiant Saddam and seven former regime officials all pleaded not guilty Wednesday to charges including murder and torture on the first day of a trial by millions watched across the globe.
"The trial of the 21st Century — Saddam and his era in the dock," was the headline of Iraq's Al-Mashiraq newspaper. Saddam and the seven former cohorts for the killing of more than 140 Shiites from the village of Dujail in 1982 after an attempt on his life there. The accused face execution if convicted.
The New Zealand News channel somberly added: "It is the first time an Arab leader has gone on trial for crimes against his own people." Thanks. I'm happy to see that someone is keeping count. The News got it right though: the trial of Saddam is a trial of his era and his regime. As such, it is an important vehicle to legitimate the current consitutional, legal order and contrast it to the former "bad" state. In a bizarre twist of fate, the legal trial seems to be about white men saving brown people from brown men. Have we seen this before? Colonialism? Surely you jest. The double irony comes that this removal of the leader may ultimately be better for the nation of Iraq as it distances itself from the Baathist past. Needless to say that this trial comes against the backdrop of the election in Iraq. My original thoughts on the trial here.

Eric Posner, international law guru and skeptic here at the University of Chicago (Law School) compares this to the trial of Charles I, 1649. Of course, I should be careful to praise Posner too much given this turgid explanation of the fairness of Saddam's trial:
Whether Saddam is executed or imprisoned for life, the outcome will be (substantively) fair, regardless of whether the trial is procedurally fair. The only possible unfairness would be an acquittal or short sentence. To be sure, the trial should be procedurally fair, to the extent that logistics, politics, security, and administrative convenience permit. But procedural fairness does not exist in a vacuum; it must be weighed against other considerations. [Human Rights Watch]-style legalism is what led to the Milosevic trial, which has been dragging on for almost four years with no end in sight. If procedural fairness as HRW understands it requires a four year trial of Saddam, then better to do without procedural fairness. (emphasis mine)
Apparently we have a choice between procedural fairness and substantive fairness. That at least is possible to grasp. But how does one determine what is "substantively fair" in a vacuum outside one's own subjective, particular preference. For a legalistic moralizing doesn't occur in a vacuum? The comparisons of Saddam to Hitler, and the media emphasis on his gassing of the Kurds (no mention was given of Kurdish terrorism) surely won't have an effect on what we perceive to be "substantively fair".

My favorite criteria that Posner is ready to dispense with is administrative convenience. I'd love to hear a defense of that remark. What is the rule of law if not procedural fairness to create a potentially objective mechanism located outside individual preference? Given that the state needs this trial to shore up legitimacy, it better be as fair as possible. Otherwise the new Iraqi state looks like a puppet of the United States, whose on legal record is looking a little spotty right now. (Did someone say torture?)

Although to hear a law professor offer that law is procedurally fair "to the extent that logistics, politics, security, and administrative convenience permit" might have been worth that eruption of dislogic. Law is just politics, and politics is about power, dominion, and domination. You know what's missing from that list? Fairness, justice, and truth. A pity, really.



 
American Army Overextended?

(1) Troop Strength
Our nation's army is horribly over-deployed. This stretching of a national resources has led, as we know, to the slower than preferred response of the Department of Homeland Security to Katrina, and to increasingly shorter times between deployments. A Rand analysis piece by Lynn Davis and J. Michael Polich comments on this worrisome issue. Lynn Davis, a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, was U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security affairs from 1993 to 1997. She recently visited the University of Chicago to give us a briefing on this very thing. For those interested in the research brief, go here. Defense analyst Michael Polich is a senior behavioral scientist at RAND. They warn us that:

Today, the bulk of the active-duty army is either in Iraq, returning from Iraq, or preparing to go to Iraq. The formerly part-time soldiers in the National Guard now account for about 40 percent of the brigades deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. And since the war began in Iraq two years ago, the length of a standard mobilization for reserve units going there has risen well above the one-year goal that was originally intended.

These events have placed a growing strain on the U.S. Army as it seeks to train its soldiers and to maintain a pool of units ready to respond rapidly to new contingencies. This situation confronts the nation with urgent questions about the proper size of the army’s active and reserve forces, about the optimum number and types of combat units needed to sustain high levels of overseas deployments while maintaining readiness for other missions, and about the effects on soldiers and units stretched thin by the repeated, rapid rotations.

(2) Equipment
Besides the thinning of troop strength, the United States' military, especially the reserve forces, also finds itself short on equipment. Seemingly an ominous implication of Secretary of Defense's Rumsfield's retort to a querying soldier at an Army Q-and-A a few months back, we have the army that we have and not the one that we want. The army seems to get the equipment that it has and not the equipment that it needs or wants.

Every time I read or hear about the campaign in Iraq I get the sneaky suspicion that we had no idea what we were getting ourselves into.

The New York Times offers:

Guard units in the United States have, on average, only 34 percent of their authorized equipment and are especially short of trucks, helicopters, night-vision goggles, radios and other communications equipment, said the report, which was released at a hearing of the House Committee on Government Reform.

In addition to 64,000 pieces of equipment left in Iraq for other units when Guard units rotated back the United States, 101,000 pieces have been transferred to deploying units to ensure they are fully equipped for combat, the report said.

Guard officials believe the response to Hurricane Katrina "was more complicated because significant quantities of critical equipment such as satellite communications equipment, radios, trucks, helicopters and night-vision goggles were deployed to Iraq," the report said.

This seems bad for any "global war on terror" American wanted to fight.



Wednesday, October 19, 2005
 
The Failed Doctrine of States' Rights, II
A Legal and Theorectical Argument About Gay Equality

Gay Marriage and Civil Unions fall under the purview of contested identity claims. As the New York Times wrote: "A 2004 Virginia law, the Marriage Affirmation Act, makes same-sex unions from other states "void in all respects in Virginia." Judge John R. Prosser, of Frederick County Circuit Court in Winchester, Va., relied on that law in October in granting sole custody of Isabella to Ms. Miller. Two potentially conflicting federal laws add to the confusion. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act largely tracks the state custody laws and requires other states to defer to the first courts to hear such cases. But the federal Defense of Marriage Act says states need not give effect to same-sex unions." The contradiction of state and local laws not only creates confusion about what the status of same-sex relationships are, but leaves in question whether gays and lesbians can be rights-bearing persons as homosexuals. Their civil rights are provisional at best when the states and Congress can, with impunity, declare that marriages can only be between a man and a woman, and, that states who do not wish to recognize the conferral of civil equality to persons from their state, needn't.

(1) Lawrence didn't recognize fully homosexuals as a legal category.

The rights of persons in the capacity as homosexuals are also provisional given the wording of Lawrence v. Texas 539 U. S. ____ (2003). Justice Kennedy concludes the opening paragraph of the court's opinion with these words (which ought to be immortalized): "Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions." The Supreme Court, then, sets an ambitious goal for this opinion; in the presumption of an autonomous self inclusive of thinking, creed, expression, and intimacy, the Court must show how the spatial and transcendent liberty of a person is abridged or implicated in laws forbidding "sodomy." The problem arises, immediately, that the Court will need to distinguish a liberty of persons as it relates to "thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct" and not the liberty of persons as sexual beings. The Court, in the opening sentence, further specified the location of the infringement of these rights: a dwelling or private place. Since "[l]iberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places", the rights enumerated in this opinion only exist against the government in a dwelling or private place. Thus the question of whether the government can "criminalize two persons of the same sex... engaging in certain intimate sexual conduct" is the concrete form of the liberty that one can only have in a private place. Thus, the court is only going to decide a question of privacy, not of the capacity of homosexual to bear rights. Changes the triumphalist story we want to tell about Lawrence, doesn't it?

Am I making too much of an opening statement? The Court traces its lineage of history through Griswold, where Kennedy announced that the issue that opinion decided was: "the right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship." The key there is that these decisions are made outside the institution of marriage. The privacy right discovered in Griswold is located legally outside the bounds of marriage. Even though he believes that Court had, by the Roe decsion, made the rights personal, he does track the extramarital nature of these rights: "In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972), the Court invalidated a law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons. The case was decided under the Equal Protection Clause, id., at 454; but with respect to unmarried persons...." (8)* The only detail that Kennedy, then, seems set to add in Lawrence is whether those behaviors outside marriage can be criminalized for persons.

I cannot emphasize enough how these persons are not homosexual in their essence. When Kennedy turns to the case of Bowers v. Hardwick, he states that the issue of that case was: "
whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time.” Id., at 190, emphasis added. Kennedy then maintains: "The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals." (10, emphasis added) He quickly moves the concrete rights of the homosexual, whose rights he offers may or may not be "entitled to formal recognition in the law", and makes the question one of the rights of persons who freely choose.

The opinion then quickly displaces the homosexual as the concrete matter of concern stating that "At the outset it should be noted that there is no long-standing history in this country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter." (11) This allows Kennedy to justify his universalization and sublation of 'homosexual' into 'person' and 'individual.' This marginalization of homosexuals as a rights-worthy category is most apparent when Kennedy writes: "Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do." (17) Homosexuals are persons who take certain actions where heterosexual persons are worthy of rights as heterosexuals. Later Kennedy will clarify exactly what the Court is, and isn't, speaking about when it declares that liberty has spatial and transcendent dimensions. "It does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives." The petitioners only evidence behaviors attributed to a homosexual life-style; they are not homosexuals. Even though "liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt", we are left wondering whether homosexuals will be able to be protected as homosexuals, not merely as consenting adults engaging in sodomy.

The Court's distaste at creating the category of homosexual as legal category to whom rights can be granted temporarily fades when Kennedy wrote "when homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres." There is a relationship, the Court begrudges, between a person and their most intimate acts. The continued existence of Bowers "as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons."

Kennedy knows, however, that the enforcement of these arcane laws does not occur in a social vacuum, and that the homosexual identity has become politicized when he admits "[l]aws prohibiting sodomy do not seem to have been enforced against consenting adults acting in private." The historical need for sodomy laws, he offers were in fact quite benevolent because a "substantial number of sodomy prosecutions and convictions for which there are surviving records were for predatory acts against those who could not or did not consent, as in the case of a minor or the victim of an assault. As to these, one purpose for the prohibitions was to ensure there would be no lack of coverage if a predator committed a sexual assault that did not constitute rape as defined by the criminal law." (12) In fact, "It was not until the 1970’s that any State singled out same-sex relations for criminal prosecution, and only nine States have done so."

Even though Lawrence did not qualify homosexuals as rights-bearing category, the case did, however, open the floodgates by suggesting that homosexuals qua their sexuality are discriminated against and stigmatized in the modern world. However, the Court specifically offered that the public may or may not recognize homosexuals as more than consent adults during private things, as that right to privacy derived specifically outside of marriage. O'Connor's concurrence in particular moves the Court in recognizing homosexuals as a legal category. She stated: "We have consistently held, however, that some objectives, such as “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group,” are not legitimate state interests....[I]n Romer v. Evans, we disallowed a state statute that “impos[ed] a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group”—specifically, homosexuals....Sodomy between opposite-sex partners, however, is not a crime in Texas. That is, Texas treats the same conduct differently based solely on the participants. Those harmed by this law are people who have a same-sex sexual orientation and thus are more likely to engage in behavior prohibited by §21.06. The Texas statute makes homosexuals unequal in the eyes of the law by making particular conduct—and only that conduct—subject to criminal sanction."(25) Even though O'Connor would allow non-specific sodomy laws to continue existing, she does see homosexuals as a group deserving of rights.

(2) The same bigotry: the Federal government cannot be expected to lead the opinions of the American government. Kennedy continued to reaffirm that it was not the proper place of the court to decide whether these persons ought to be socially accepted. Even though the Court's decision inspired the Massachusetts Court, against the express wishes of the legislature, to recognized equal marriage rights, the status of homosexuals as rights-bearing individuals is still debatable.

What does it mean to be a gay person in America? We know that it used to mean having your sexual relations criminalized. It also means, given the Defense of Marriage Act, that your unions are not federally recognized. But you do have private rights against the government in your bedroom with another consenting adult.

How could we leave such a status to be defined by states? Different states will have different protections and, as such, leave homosexuals, their relationships, and the children of these unions, unprotected by the very institutions of this country that ought to guarantee justice. Equal marriage is a federal issue, if only because the rights of homosexuals should be equal across the nation just like every other category of persons.

Ted Steven's had the right of it when he said:

In my youth, in my manhood, in my old age, I had fondly dreamed that when
any fortunate chance should have broken up for a while the foundation of or
institution, and released us from obligations the most tyrannical that ever
man imposed in the name of freedom, that the intelligent, pure and just men
of this Republic...would have so remodeled all our institutions as to have freed
them from every vestige of human oppression, of inequality of rights,
of the recognized degradation of the poor, and the superior caste of the
rich...This bright dream has vanished 'like the baseless fabric of a dream.' I find that
we shall be obliged to be content with patching up the worst portions of the
ancient edifice, and leaving it, in many of its parts, to be swept through by...the storms of despotism
. (39th Congress, 1st Session, 3148)

*Pagination based off of the page counter at the bottom of Adobe Acrobat.



 
The Failed Doctrine of States' Rights, I
A Historical Argument on the Necessity of Federal Enforcement of Rights

Custody After Civil Union Pits States and Judges

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/08/national/08custody.html
By ADAM LIPTAK

MONTPELIER, Vt., Sept. 7 - Judges in Vermont
and Virginia have different ideas about what is best for Isabella Miller-Jenkins, 3, born to a woman who had a civil union with another woman in Vermont. The relationship ended two years ago. Now each woman says Isabella is her daughter, with one asserting exclusive motherhood.

The judge in Vermont ruled that the women should "be treated no differently than a husband and wife." He established a visiting schedule and held the biological mother, Lisa Miller, in contempt of court when she failed to comply with it.

The judge in Virginia ruled that Ms. Miller had the sole right to decide who could see the child. He ruled that the former partner, Janet Miller-Jenkins, had no "parentage or visitation rights." Legal experts say the decisions, which reached State Supreme Court here on Wednesday, are the first to present a direct conflict between two state courts on a substantial legal question arising from a same-sex couple's union. The decisions offer a preview, the experts added, of what are quite likely to be many similar conflicts around the nation.

Ms. Miller moved back to Virginia, where Isabella was born, in September 2003. The couple had visited Vermont briefly for the civil union ceremony in 2000 and lived there for more than a year after Isabella was born in 2002.

"When I left Janet," Ms. Miller said in a telephone interview, "I left the homosexual lifestyle and drew closer to God."

Ms. Miller-Jenkins, who declined to be interviewed, has said the couple planned and cared for Isabella together. She read a statement outside the courthouse after arguments on Wednesday."I sincerely believe," she said, "that it is best for my daughter that both of her parents continue to be an active, loving, responsible part of her life."

The justices here were largely skeptical of the arguments offered by a lawyer for Ms. Miller, who, like her former partner, had been known as Ms. Miller-Jenkins. The justices also indicated that they were working in uncharted territory.

"The assisted reproductive technologies are galloping ahead of existing
law," Justice Marilyn S. Skoglund said.

A few minutes later, Justice Denise R. Johnson asked about the consequences of inconsistent rulings. A lawyer for Ms. Miller-Jenkins, Jennifer L. Levi, said the question was premature. A Virginia appeals court will hear arguments in that suit next Wednesday.

"I'm just trying to figure out what the effect of our decision is," Justice Johnson said, in a tone suggesting it might have no effect because Isabella and Ms. Miller live in Virginia.

The cases involve the interaction of two sets of laws. At the state level, Vermont and Virginia have laws that say the first court to take jurisdiction of a custody case should make the final determination. That would seem to help Ms. Miller-Jenkins here.

In November 2003, it was Ms. Miller, the Virginian, who filed papers in Vermont to dissolve the union. In them, Ms. Miller acknowledged that Isabella was a child of the union and asked the court to allow her former partner to have contact with the girl. Her lawyers have since taken varying positions. Ms. Miller now says she was confused and did not mean to acknowledge any parental relationship between her former partner and Isabella.

A 2004 Virginia law, the Marriage Affirmation Act, makes same-sex unions from other states "void in all respects in Virginia." Judge John R. Prosser, of Frederick County Circuit Court in Winchester, Va., relied on that law in October in granting sole custody of Isabella to Ms. Miller. Two potentially conflicting federal laws add to the confusion. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act largely tracks the state custody laws and requires other states to defer to the first courts to hear such cases. But the federal Defense of Marriage Act says states need not give effect to same-sex
unions.

Joan Hollinger, who teaches adoption law at the University of California, Berkeley, said the Vermont judge had the better legal arguments. But, Ms. Hollinger added, "Vermont courts are in practical terms powerless to enforce their valid orders in Virginia if Virginia courts simply say no."

If the states' highest courts issue conflicting decisions, the case could head for the United States Supreme Court, said Mathew D. Staver, a lawyer for Ms. Miller. Mr.
Staver added that similar conflicts could arise from decisions in California, where State Supreme Court ruled last month that both people in a lesbian couple should be considered a child's parents in many circumstances. The Legislature in Sacramento passed a same-sex marriage law on Tuesday. Ms. Levi disagreed, saying the case was an instance of the ordinary heartbreak after a family breaks up.

"It's an unfortunate reality that children get put in the middle," she said. "Ultimately, what this case is going to decide is whether children born to same-sex couples should be treated the same or differently as other children."

Andrew Koppelman, a law professor at Northwestern, addressed such case in a book on interstate recognition of gay marriages that Yale University Press will publish next year. "If the Virginia court is correct," Professor Koppelman wrote, "then no parental right arising out of a same-sex marriage is secure anywhere in the United States."

Ms. Miller said Isabella neither knew about the case nor cares about its consequences. "She doesn't even ask about Janet," Ms. Miller said. "I am the only mother."

In Vermont, Judge Cohen held Ms. Miller in contempt in September for
not allowing visits to Isabella. He has not imposed sanctions.

"The judicial system as a whole simply cannot allow parties to try to take advantage of legal and cultural differences," he wrote, "which may make one state favor the position of a particular party over another."

Ms. Miller said she found the idea that a court could force her to allow Isabella to visit Ms. Miller-Jenkins particularly hurtful. "It would be like somebody off the streets coming and taking my daughter," she said. "They have no ties to my daughter."

It is always popular-- and to that some would add other loaded terms like 'reasonable' or 'pragmatic'-- to argue that the most contentious issues of our day, or identity/rights claims not envisioned by our Founders, should be left to the states to work out. The equality of persons within the institution of marriage is one such issue today, just abortion was such an issue until Roe v. Wade and black status within America until the 13th-15th amendments.

History repeats itself in the most ironic ways. The argument over the political status of the emancipated classes during Reconstruction provide guidance, I believe, toward addressing the claims of those who would like to make the marriage issue a state-issue versus a federal issue. After detailing my reading of the Reconstruction period, I would like to use the New York Time's piece for some practical evidence for my theoretical claims.

Reconstruction Debates over Federal Power

(1) After Lincoln died and Andrew Johnson become President of the United States, Andrew Johnson largely wanted to accomplished two goals during Reconstruction. The first was to get create state governments of loyal Unionists in the south and to seat Senators from southern states seated as soon as possible. The second goal was to not seem too punitive on the South now the war was over. President Johnson largely supported the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment outlawing slavery in all of the United States. Other issues, like the political and social status of the freedmen Johnson wanted to leave to states. The Radical Republicans, led by Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner, not only wanted to punish the Southern rebels, but wanted to both create large bodies of Republican voters and provide for the general welfare of the emancipated classes. The fight for black suffrage in the South had begun.

The southern states were furious that the Republicans were considering the enfranchisement of the Negro. Their main argument was that blacks being able to vote in the South was hypocritical given the treatment of blacks in the North. Northern blacks, suffering under fierce discrimination and segregation, were a testament to the Southern whites that the South was not peculiar in its dislike and distrust of the Negro. As far as the southerners were concerned, since they had already caved on the issue of emancipation, the issue of suffrage was another Republican plot to humiliate and destroy genteel Southern culture.

The national Democrats were similarly against black suffrage. States had traditional enjoyed the right to definite and delineate who the eligible voters were. The usurpation of that right by the federal government, which conveniently was under Republican control, empowered the Republicans too much, and created a rival body politic in the south to Democrat hegemony. (The recent appoint of Salmon Chase to the chief justiceship of the United States solidified Republican control over all three branches.) Many of the moderate and conservative constitutional scholars were in favor of leaving this issue of suffrage to the states.

Besides the obvious question of what black emancipation would entail if it didn't include land and didn't include suffrage, what Southern state would have protected black rights if left to its own devices? The historical record clearly demonstrates that the state governments, rather than legislating to enable and expand the freedom of blacks, took every legislative means to restrict that freedom. The southern states, in their infamous black codes, justified the restriction of blacks' freedom of movement--for the freedom of movement was their substantive civil right at the time--based on the laziness of black laborers.

The southern argument against the laziness of blacks, as well as the American conception of work in general, has always struck me as a bit odd. When the blacks were still enslaved, the plantation owners, with their leisurely life of indolence, often exclaimed that blacks were insufficiently motivated to work. This southern argument seemed to continue after the war into reconstruction because many of the black laborers became migrants, or, refused to work as wage-laborers on the cotton plantations. Northern elites intervened into the debate over black labor power to, somewhat condescendingly, maintain that the freedmen, like their Northern white counterparts, must labor, save, accumulate, and purchase their economic self-sufficiency rather than expect the federal government to provide it for them.

Many blacks did in fact work, just not in the traditional cotton occupations, save for the cases where the lands were freedmen-owned. The issue at heart for them at the time was economic self-sufficiency. "The sole ambition of the freedman at the present time appears to be to become the owner of a little piece of land...to be able to do that free from any outside control." The former slaves wanted to participate in determining when and under what conditions they would sell their labor power. Eric Foner, in his book Reconstruction, records the desires of the freedman to control their own labor power made in the pages of the New York Tribune and the "convention of the colored people of Virgina": "We scorn and treat with contempt the allegation...that we understand Freedom to mean idleness and indolence. But we do understand Freedom to mean industry and the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits thereof." (103)

By contrast, most of the southern economic elite, and their northern financial backers, wanted an immobile, cheap labor force to jump start the agricultural, cotton, export economy. The states took many steps, from confiscating black land to collapsing black banks, to reduce the economic sufficiency of blacks.


(2) Grant and Federal Power

My argument, as it is unfolding, is this: state governments cannot be relied on to secure the rights of a persecuted minority absent specific instructions and interventions from a federal authority. We began to see such an intervention, and a corresponding improvement in the freedman's condition after federal intervention.

U.S. Grant was to become a very controversial president as he often intervened into traditionally dominated state-law areas to protect freedmen and poor whites from the mercy of the landed-gentry in the south. He recreated the military governments of the south, while expanding the war against the Indians in the West, and allowed the government to hear cases in military courts until forbidden to do so by the Supreme Court. Unlike under Johnson's Reconstruction, many of the black political leaders were able to participate fully in elections and sent representatives and senators to Washington.

Grant's constant interventions into southern political and cultural life produced and encouraged southern resistance to federal rule. This resistance took both legal and extralegal forms. The legal resistance to a strengthened federalism masqueraded under states' rights. Indeed, on constitutional grounds, the legal scholars possessed a not-insubstantial claim. Before the passage of the 14th and 15th amendments, the Congressional discussion of the civil and political rights of persons were generally questions exclusively of state concern. Alternatively, many congressmen knew that the Congress had to define exactly what emancipation meant for it to have any teeth. The extra-legal resistance came in the form of the Klu Klux Klan, and other groups designed to terrorize the black, and complicitous white, population into submission. Whenever any advocate of advanced civil rights and civil equality appeared in southern life, the resistance would ride forth and either vandalize and destroy property, or, kill, maim, and murder ambassadors of freedom.

As Grant's administration went on, and these acts of violence and resistance did not diminish, the Republican coalition grew wary of federal interventions into the states in the name of the 14th amendment. In fact as more and more of the old abolitionists died--Charles Sumner, Thaddeus Stevens, etc.--the liberal Republicans, centered on Charles Francis Adams, became more pro-business and less pro-civil rights. Grant's belief in needing to protect all people who lived under the Constitution was proving to be messy, and the Reconstruction issue was become quite unpopular in northern and southern sentiment.

In deed, the Radicals, after their passage of the 15th amendment, and their codification of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 into the 14th amendment (take that originalists!), had lost most of their political capital in the Republican party. Ted Stevens remarked to the 39th Congress during Johnson's administration, that Congress and the federal government were "making a nation" and that obsolete "technical scruples" should not be allowed to stand in the way. Most of the Radicals wanted to remake southern society from the ground-up, from the emancipation to the enfranchisement of the Negro. The point here is, absent federal intervention, and the forceful ratification of the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendment, blacks would have never had any legal protections at all.

(3) The states could not be counted upon to come up with a uniform defense or even positive declaration of the rights of black persons. The political actors in each state were much too busy trying to control labor conditions as they had in the days of slavery to award any substantive measure of freedom to the freedmen. As the free blacks of New Orleans quickly found out, after emancipation, the definition of equality and freedom in American society was quickly beginning to correlate along racial, as well as, class lines. Whereas the poorest white Americans had always been trapped and were virtual slaves to the system of their landless wage-labor and lack of political rights, the freedmen and free persons of color encountered new barriers to their social mobility: social exclusions and an unequal application and enforcement of the law. Extrajudicial terror aside, being black quickly became a second-level of oppression with the institutional violence inchoate with American politics trying to obliterate and erode the agency, independence, and will of the blacks under the system. (As the election of 1872 would demonstrate, white women were also quickly coming to understand this sense of group oppression.)

My next post will address the claims of gay activists. The argument here, evidenced from the history of Reconstruction, is that contested rights--when the very admissibility of the person as a rights-bearing individual is at stake--never are protected by state governments until the federal government compels them to do so. Absent federal intervention, at least in determining the capacity of the contested persons to bear rights at all, state governments will never secure either the rights in question or establish said person as having the capacity to bear those rights.



Tuesday, October 18, 2005
 
Beyond the Pale?

Adam Shpeen over at the Agenda Gap (good stuff guys keep up the good work) made a very interesting remark today concerning a debate at Dartmouth on torture. First he quoted from the Dartmouth's summary of the event:


Attendees at a Monday discussion about whether torturing wartime prisoners is
justified ran into protesters at the door of Filene Auditorium who argued that
the subject should not be up for debate. History professor Ronald Edsforth
organized the protests and distributed handouts at the door detailing his
position. "Should we Americans be debating whether our government should be
civilized or barbarian? Some issues have been settled. Some issues should not be
debated," Edsforth's handout read. "Torture and extra-judicial killing are not
legitimate policy options. They should be condemned by all as barbaric, illegal
and immoral."

After which Shpeen wrote:


Edsforth's protest baffles me. I agree with Edsforth that torture is
categorically wrong and that no government, in wartime or in peace, should
permit itself to employ such measures. However, does that mean that individuals
ought not to even broach the topic? Does a well-informed, healthy debate on the
merits of torture really threaten society so much that it must be censored or
banned? Of course not! There are powerful arguments in favor of the use of
torture - arguments I happen to disagree with but arguments I acknowledge
nonetheless. Quite frankly, the censorship of a debate on any immoral topic, be
it torture, Nazism, racism, etc., is in fact a serious danger to the civil
liberties we enjoy in our country. Edsforth's radicalism hurts his reputation
and his country.

Adam frames the debate over Edsforth's remark to concern "a well-informed, healthy debate on the merits of torture" the censorship of which would be "a serious danger to the civil liberties we enjoy." He juxtaposes this to the claim that the debate itself would surely not threaten society. Edsforth, on the hand, seems to be defending a very different kind of ideal. In his mind liberal democracies ought to consider some issues settled for the purposes of debate; some practices are so morally indefensible to merit only condemnation as "barbaric, illegal, and immoral." Shpeen and Edsforth aren't actually talking to one another. Whereas Adam sees a political and civil issue, Edsforth has staked a normative-moral position.

Are there some topics that democracies oughtn't talk about due to lack of moral justification and defensibility? Should we debate rights that are moral indefeasiable, or, alternatively should we view this only as a civil-political issue. What if there was debate on "Should slavery be legal in the United States?", should persons attend? How about "Should women have the right to vote?" Edsforth's logic seems intuitively true here. There are some questions that ought to be so settled in a liberal democracy that are beyond the pale of free speech protection. Amy Gutmann's thoughts on the issue, now president of the University of Pennsylvania, will help frame my next few comments.

Let me be clear here: universities and communities dedicated to intellectual inquiry should aim to give the broadest possible protection to speech-acts and discourse. However, these same communities need a shared moral vocabulary larger and richer than our right to free speech. Guttmann writes in Multiculturalism that views which should earn our respect as political liberals are those positions we can understand as "reflecting a moral point of view." Can a defense of torture and extra-judicial killings, the specific policies Edsforth doesn't want us to debate, be seen as reflecting a moral point of view? Perhaps Adam cannot not so quickly answer that question. Even though Gutmann's next quote was meant to deal particularly with racist and sexist speech, I believe that it applicable to the moral logic behind Edsforth's protest: "[Certain] incidents [of speech] challenge members of liberal democratic communities to articulate the most fundamental moral presuppostions that unite us. We fail ourselves, and more importantly, [potential victims] if we do not respond the often unthinking, some drunken disregard for the most elementary standards of human decency."

I welcome discussion and deliberations on this point.



 
Diaspora and the Jewish Contribution to History

Eric Hosbawm concludes in the London Review of Books: "there are those [Jews] who wish to withdraw from it into the old segregation of religious ultra-Orthodoxy and the new segregation of a separate ethnic-genetic state-community. If they were to succeed I do not think it will be good either for the Jews or for the world." These sentences conclude an excellent essay reflecting on Jewish success, and lack thereof in some centuries, as it relates to diaspora, integration, antisemitism, and the ghetto. He offers that the Jews have benefited most when they lived with Gentiles and when they were not experiences discrimination. However, the most productive moments came when emancipated and secularized Jews were the most aware of their perpetual otherness in the gentile, white imagination. One of the ironic effects, he notes of the Holocaust, is that it has greatly reduced the Jewish diaspora among the Islamic countries and destroyed most of the vestiges of Western antisemitism. This has produced a concentration of Jews in Israel, a move by some Jewish theocratic communities to withdraw again from the world, and widespread acceptance. A very good essay from an amazing historian.



Monday, October 17, 2005
 
Miers Unforeseen, but Unsurprising: The Invisible Hand

There has been a lot of confusion over exactly why President Bush nominated Harreit Miers, especially among the blogging intelligentsia. Rather than jumping directly into the fray and putting my opinion on whether Miers was qualified or not, I spent two weeks collecting data and now believe that I have made sense of the nomination. There are four reasons that contribute to the current President nominating someone as underwhelming to elites as Harriet Miers: (1) Bush is a pro-business president above all else, (2) The Senate Republicans placed him in a strange tactical situation, (3) The White House views qualifications differently from the blogosphere and doesn’t really buy into the meritocracy myth, and (4) the Republicans have to support Bush on the final count due to the touch of Karl Rove and the Bush money-machine. I am going to try and develop these ideas which are going to put me directly at odds with many people much more accomplished than myself. Since it is a long argument, I will break the post up into pieces and release them as I write them.

(1) That Bush is a pro-business president is not a controversial point.

As John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge remind us in The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America, George Bush, having gone to Yale as an undergraduate, possesses an MBA from Harvard Business School, and is the first American president with an MBA to hold high office. His administration also holds more CEO appointments than any heretofore. Eisenhower, who is often lauded as being a little too friendly to big business only had two former CEOs in his Cabinet. Bush started with seven: Dick Cheney of Haliburton, Donald Rumsfield of G.D Searle and General Instruments, Don Evans of Denver-based Tom Brown, Andrew Card of General Motors, Ann Veneman (agricultural secretary) of Calgene, Condoleezza Rice (a political scientist) of Chevron Corporation, and Paul O’neill of Alcoa. Colin Powell has an MBA, Miers was a coporate lawyer, and Alberto Gonzales worked for Vinson and Elkins, who represented Enron prior to its collapse.

Bush has consistently subsidized the coffers of large corporations and has done his best to remove those pesky environmental protections that prevent more wealth concentration and calcification into the hands of corporate entities and CEOs. The Kyoto protocol was pronounced dead in the same brusque manner that the dark, lurking Rumsfield notified Europe of its historic divisions between “old” and “new” Europe. (That must have been the most politic way to say: France, Germany, fuck off.) Business interests have trumpeted free-market rhetoric at times. Recall Bush’s almost trade war with Europe over steel, until the World Trade Organization settled the debate.

(2) Filling O’Connor’s seat was crucial to Bush as well, but not for the reasons movement conservatives think.

David Strauss, weighing on whether justice generally change their ideological orientation over time, offers:


Why, then, do people think that justices routinely change their views? Sometimes
the issues, not the justices, change. A "liberal" on the New Deal might be
"conservative" on matters of race relations or civil liberties; the unanimity of
the Roosevelt justices began to fray when those issues came to the fore. A judge
who was a "conservative" on criminal issues might be a "liberal" on reproductive
freedom: Roe vs. Wade would have come out the other way, had not three of the
Nixon four joined in the seven-justice majority.
Strauss has got it quite right: that the ideology of a justice depends on the issue that you catch them on.

Movement conservatives and the blogging intelligentsia have focused the debate on whether or not Miers will be more or less consistently conservative than O’Connor. However, O’Connor’s jurisprudence has only been a swing seat in regards to the most popular social and cultural issues of the day. Cass Sustein typologizes O’Connor’s jurisprudence in his latest book Radicals in Robes as the judicial minimalism that he so loves. While I haven’t yet bought the book (it’s on my January purchase list), Sustein’s clear writing style allowed me to finish most of the book in an hour at the University of Chicago’s Barnes and Noble’s bookstore. Continuing the line of thought from his landmark book (at least for my thinking on Constitutional issues) One Case at a Time, he argues that judicial minimalism, as opposed to perfectionist liberalism or legal fundamentalism (read: movement conservatives restoring the ‘Constitution-in-exile’) pushes law through nudges rather than earthquakes. O’Connor was such a judge; her concurrences and opinions have often (much to my chagrin sometimes) tried to decide cases as narrowly as possible whereas the concurrences of Scalia, Thomas, and Marshall have often wanted to rewrite, rethink, and revamp entire sections of constitutional jurisprudence.

Movement conservatives are tenacious and audacious legal fundamentalists who want to impose their counterreformation against the New Deal, Warren, and Burger courts through the force of their intellects, opinions, and dissents. Indeed, by conflating “legal competence” with “legal fundamentalism” and “jurisprudential perfectionism”, the legal elite have created the norm that a judge, to be considered qualified for the Supreme Court, needs to have a long history of constitutional interpretation on one side or the other. Jacob Levy makes this very point in his post about Miers:


People who hold it actually believe-- rightly-- that this appointment is wrong,
that friendship with the president is not a qualification for the Supreme Court,
that constitutional law does require hard intellectual work that requires
practice and thought in advance, and that the absence of any of the conventional
qualifications is something to at least worry about.
Levy’s “hard intellectual work” and “conventional qualifications” stem simply from that fact that the academic and ideological elite on both sides believe that any Supreme Court seat in general, and O’Connor’s seat, in particular ought to be about rigorous constitution jurisprudence and defendable constitutional political theory.

I hate to disappoint my future colleages but the Supreme Court, being coequal with the other branches of government, engages in politics! That means determining who gets what, when, where, and how. David Strauss reminds us what’s really at stake when he maintained:


when the Supreme Court in the mid-1930s struck down some of the social-welfare
laws and business regulations that were at the heart of President Franklin
Roosevelt's New Deal, Roosevelt attacked the court and said he wanted justices
who would take a more expansive view of federal power. Roosevelt made eight
appointments to the court, and he got what he wanted: Every one of the Roosevelt
appointees, to the end of his career, deferred to Congress on laws having to do
with federal authority over the economy.

In addition, lest you think that Roosevelt is an extreme example due to his court packing scheme, Strauss continues:


President Richard Nixon made campaign promises to appoint justices who would
stop the expansion of criminal defendants' rights and slow the pace of racial
desegregation. Nixon made four appointments in his first term, and within less
than a decade the Supreme Court had done exactly what Nixon promised--and has
not changed course since.
Desegregation, criminal right’s, deference to social-welfare laws, are not merely matters of constitutional divination and legal gnosticism, but matters of division, redistribution, and allocation in a world of finite resources. In short, questions of politics and not of theory.

(3) O’Connor’s seat is a seat for pro-business pragmatic judges now.

O’Connor was a consistently pro-business judge and, as such, needed to be replaced by another pro-business judge. Bradford Plumer hits the nail on the head: "she'll be a perfect replacement for O'Connor, who was a very similar type of business-friendly, don't-rock-the-boat type of judge. Movement conservatives like Antonin Scalia or Janice Rogers Brown are too unpredictable. Miers, on the other hand, worked for a Dallas firm that specialized in the basics. She's perfect.” Jack Balkin even takes the time to clarify what business conservatives want out of politics:

Business conservatives are less interested in shaking up the world than in
stability and in clearing a path for the promotion of their interests. Although
their goals may often overlap with the goals of movement conservatives and
religious conservatives, they are relatively uninterested in religious
proselytization or ideological crusading. Business conservatives are pragmatists
at heart, and the promotion of capital makes them more cosmopolitan in spite of
themselves… And what, exactly, does business want? Overturning the New Deal? The Constitution in Exile? The return of God to the public schools? The end of
affirmative action? Outlawing abortion once and for all? Squashing gays and
lesbians underfoot? None of these things. What business wants is stability,
comfort, predictability, and an agile, productive, submissive and demobilized
population. It wants a powerful executive that can protect America's interests
abroad. It wants a Congress freed from federal judicial oversight that is able
to dish out the pork, jiggle the tax code and deregulate the economy according
to its ever shifting concerns and interests. And it wants a Supreme Court that
will give a pro-business President and a pro-business Congress a free hand, a
Court that will protect the rights of employers over employees, advertisers over
consumer groups, and corporations over environmentalists. It wants, in short,
someone very much like Harriet Miers.

All this goes to say that if my estimation of Miers is correct, then Cass Sustein should come out in full support of her. If you think that I have concocted this whole problem of big business's interest in the courts, or, bordered on conspiracy theory, I will address these problems by quoting at length from a piece in the Houston Chronicle:

"Her business background won't solve all our problems and concerns, but now,
with her and (Chief Justice John) Roberts, we'll have two justices who have real-world business experience," (emphasis added) said R. Bruce Josten, chief lobbyist for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which he said is set to formally
endorse Miers. Abortion and school prayer capture more attention, but business
issues such as government regulation, employment, intellectual property and
foreign trade regularly go before the court. Miers, who has taken on Texas trial
lawyers in a battle over setting fees, has been endorsed by the American Tort
Reform Association, which favors limiting lawsuits. Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas,
defended Miers last week by saying "she has a recognition of the problems with
frivolous lawsuits and an appreciation for tort reform." Dallas attorney Fred
Baron, a past president of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America and one
of the state's most influential plaintiff lawyers, said he expects that Miers
will favor limiting lawsuits that hold corporations accountable. "She is going
to be a George Bush tort-reformer. That's where she's been," said Baron, who
sees tort reform as a closing of the courthouse to victims of bad business
behavior. "I think she'll be a strict constructionist and won't use the law for
social engineering," LaBoon said. "She isn't someone who thinks business should
pay in a lawsuit because business has plenty of money. She comes from a
background that says business is entitled to its rights like everyone else."

The article continues by giving us a glimpse into the nominees legal philosophy:

In 1995, as Republicans took control of the Texas Supreme Court, Texas trial
lawyers backed a bill that would have blocked the court from limiting attorney
fees. Miers wrote then-Gov. Bush a letter urging him to veto the bill, which he
did. In her letter, which was released last week from Bush's Texas archives, she
wrote that trial lawyers backing the effort were "greedy" and "immensely rich
and powerful." The trial lawyers, Miers went on to write, "have brought shame on
this state, badly hurt our economic-development efforts directed at creating
jobs and continue to this day to cause our state to be held in disrepute for
'justice for sale.'

Even though we disagree on businesses having rights “just like everyone else” (I’ll rethink what rights corporations and I share when I am valued at more than several hundred million dollars regularly), Miers will probably be good for the Supreme Court in so far as her minimalism will check the movement conservatives and legal fundamentalists from creating fundamental shifts in the law.




 
Re: Drezner

John, you can still take Drezner's classes at the U of C. He leaves when the current academic year ends in June or July, if I'm not mistaken. You just can't write your dissertation under him.



Thursday, October 13, 2005
 
But is his art any good?

All too predictably, Roger Kimball is upset that Harold Pinter has been awarded this year's Nobel Literature Prize. Is it because Pinter writes bad plays? Or is it because he's an "anti-American scribbler" whose award is an "exercise in politically correct sermonizing"? No prizes for the right answer. Is a paragraph or two on the aesthetics of The Dumb Waiter too much to ask for?

Update: Matt Yglesias and I share the same views.



Tuesday, October 11, 2005
 
Ack!

I'll never be able to take a class with Drezner. How could the U of C do such a thing? Potential knowledge being lost. I'm confused and depressed about the prospects of a life in academia. Grrr...



Monday, October 10, 2005
 
Drezner denied tenure

One of the best bloggers in the business has been denied tenure by the University of Chicago. It's the U of C's loss, and some other institution's gain.



Friday, October 07, 2005
 
I'm deciding about the "Harriet-who" nominations and will have reponses to Jacob Levy, Dan Drezner, and Andrew Samwick soon. My intution is that they all missed the boat on this one, but I have to think more clearly about it. I also want to offer my best possible of all futures political scenario.



 
State Weakness in International Relations

I apologize to all those who have been expecting more posts from me lately. I do have two posts that I have been working on since mid-September that will be ready for publication soon. The first concerns why gay marriage is and should be a federal issue. The second outlines my theory of constitutional interpretation. I just wrote a post, concerning state weakness which was erased by my computer that I am going to briefly recount.

The concept of state weakness, in international relations today, seems to be horribly flawed. Weakness is generally defined with respect to a state's material capabilities. If it can project force in its international relations for leverage, or, if it is generally safe from projections of power, be they market pressures or military ones, into its territory, a state is not weak. Failure to be able to do these things often leads the classification of a state as weak. There are three main flaws with this definition of weakness as I see it.

First, the definition presumes that weak states aspire to be like the great powers by assuming that all states have the same goals in an anarchic international system. Since the largest states are the most comfortable in their environment, and, have great leeway concerning the choices of other states, small and weak states covet the position, power, and privilege of these powerhouses for themselves. As they see it, the great powers are only subject the whims and preferences of other great powers with veracious appetites, whereas the smaller states are at the mercy of the international system. Great powers don't have to worry about state failure or collapse; the smaller powers do.

Second, the definition of weakness assumes that weak states are twice dazzled by the glory of the great powers. The first dazzling comes with the gross amount of power that great powers have with respect to small states. The second concerns the inability of the weak states to imagine an international relations absent the great powers. This lack of imagination leads the weak states to covet the lifestyles of the powers and emulate their strategies.

Third, the definition assumes that weakness is relative only on an objective, hierarchical scale. States can generally discern where they are on the listings (when they can't they have wars to sort them out), creating a situation where the most powerful states never need to fear being weak as long as they remain powerful. I believe that we need a more relative standard of power that grants a role to the weaker states in imaging their own future.



Monday, October 03, 2005
 
Professorial discontent at Dartmouth

The loss of Michael Gazzaniga, Jon Appleton, and Jim Kuypers -- three of Dartmouth's most distinguished faculty members -- bodes unwell for the College. They will be missed as teachers and scholars; Gazzaniga, in particular, strikes me as being almost irreplaceable (something even his soon-to-be erstwhile colleagues admit). But of greater concern are the circumstances surrounding their departure, which are disturbingly similar. Each of the departing trio has been at odds, either implicitly or explicitly, with the Dean of the Faculty Carol Folt. Gazzaniga was Folt's predecessor and resigned as Dean because of "differences among faculty members" over his management style; most likely, the same faculty who voted him out voted Folt in. Appleton (a supporter of Gazzaniga) and Kuypers have both cited Folt as a reason for their departure. All three have chosen to leave despite their fondness for Dartmouth's students. As Joe writes, "These professors were not hired away. They jumped ship." This had better not become a trend. There are more discontented Dartmouth faculty at the moment than just these three.